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LAND TENURE 'REFORM' AND DEVELOPMENT IN BOTSWANA

by

Eric Lindsay Yaxley

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A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate
Studies and Research in partial fulfilment
of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts
in Geography

Department of Geography

Carleton University

Ottawa, Ontario



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ABSTRACT

In developing countries such as Botswana access to agricultural land is still vital for a large percentage of the population. Sufficient employment and economic opportunities are simply not available in urban areas nor are they likely to be in the foreseeable future.

Botswana has recently implemented a land tenure 'reform' policy known as the Tribal Grazing Land Policy. The objectives of the policy are to reduce overgrazing, increase livestock production and to promote greater social equality, especially in rural areas. An analysis of the implementation of this policy, focusing on the Lepasha First Development Area of Central District, suggests that this policy may in fact increase disparities in rural areas, reduce arable cropland production and do little to control overgrazing.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my gratitude to the people of Botswana, and to my family for making this thesis possible. I am indebted to Dr. G. Merrill for his constructive advice and continued support, and to Fiona Thomson for her assistance in formulating many of my ideas. Lastly, I would like to thank the faculty, staff and graduate students of the Geography Department especially Norma Lafrance, for their friendliness and support.

PREFACE

Between 1977 and 1981 I worked in Serowe, Central District, Botswana, as District Officer (Land), under the sponsorship of CUSO for the Government of Botswana. The position as District Officer (Land) was basically a senior regional land use planner, which brought me into contact with a wide range of people and institutions. During this four year period, extensive travel throughout the District was carried out for a wide range of land related activities which contributed to my knowledge about the social system, government policies, and agricultural practices.

④ One well known and controversial project (at least within the District) was at Lepasha, where the Government's Tribal Grazing Land Policy (TGLP) was being implemented. This 'land reform' involved changing the land tenure system from the previous communal system to private leasehold. The TGLP's objectives which were to protect the natural environment, increase production and promote greater equality initially, seemed both logical and necessary to promote agricultural development and reduce disparities. However, concern over the continuing poverty of many rural residents, despite development efforts, led me to question the possible impact of this policy on the

poorer local residents. Also, as this was a pilot project, many of us considered that the Lepasha First Development Area (FDA) and the TGLP in general warranted close monitoring to both rectify specific project problems and to illustrate the potential impact when introduced to the nation on a larger scale. Accordingly, in this thesis I investigate the implementation of the Tribal Grazing Land Policy, and in so doing I hope to contribute to a greater understanding of some of the problems facing development efforts in Botswana. The theory of development will not be examined, in this thesis, in all of its ramifications within the social sciences.

Ottawa, Canada

May, 1983

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT	ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	iii
PREFACE	iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS	vi
LIST OF FIGURES	viii
LIST OF TABLES	ix
CHAPTER	
1 <u>Introduction to the Study</u>	1
1.1 Introduction to the Problem	1
1.2 Land Reform and Development	4
1.3 Statement of the Problem	9
1.4 Organization of the Study	10
2 <u>Physical and Historical Background to the Problem</u> ...	12
2.1 Physical Geography	12
2.2 Climate	14
2.3 Vegetation	17
2.4 Water Resources	18
2.5 Historical Background	21
3 <u>National Development</u>	28
3.1 Introduction	28
3.2 Development Strategy	29
3.3 Distribution of Government Expenditure	34
4 <u>Customary Land Tenure and Settlement</u>	41
4.1 Customary Land Tenure	41
4.2 Settlement Patterns and Agriculture	45
5 <u>The Tribal Grazing Land Policy</u>	50
5.1 Introduction	50
5.2 Administrative Change	50
5.3 Land Tenure 'Reform'	52
5.4 Impact of the Policy	59

CHAPTER

6	<u>The Lepasha First Development Area</u>	60
6.1	Introduction.....	60
6.2	Identification of a First Development Area	61
	in Central District	
6.3	Physical and Historical Background	63
6.4	Characteristics of the Lepasha Area	68
6.5	Implementation of TGLP in Lepasha	72
6.6	Land Access and Social Equality in Lepasha	76
6.7	Impact of TGLP on Livestock Production and	79
	the Environment	

7	<u>Conclusions</u>	84
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APPENDICES

I	<u>National Policy on Tribal Grazing Land Policy</u>	88
II	<u>Lepasha Survey Results</u>	110

BIBLIOGRAPHY	132
--------------------	-----

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.1	Map of Botswana	8
Figure 2.1	Vegetation Map	13
Figure 2.2	Rainfall Map	15
Figure 2.3	Potential Carrying Capacity	19
Figure 3.1	Imports and Exports at Current Prices, 1973-1978 .	30
Figure 3.2	Distribution of Cattle Ownership	38
Figure 3.3	Income (by source) for Rural Households	40
Figure 4.1	Botswana Land Tenure Zones, 1974	42
Figure 5.1	Map of Botswana Land Tenure Zones, 1980	55
Figure 5.2	National Policy for Tribal Grazing Land	57
Figure 6.1	Map of Lepasha First Development Area	64

LIST OF TABLES

Table 2.1	Annual Rainfall at Selected Locations, 1965-1979 ..	16
Table 3.1	Import and Export of Goods, 1973-1978	31
Table 3.2	Citizen Work Years in Botswana, 1978	32
Table 3.3	Capital Expenditures by Location and/or Main Beneficiary Group, 1966/67 - 1976/77	35
Table 3.4	Structure of Total Public Expenditure, 1976/77 and 1978/79	35
Table 3.5	Analysis of Planned Agricultural Development	36
	Expenditure, 1976-1981	
Table 6.1	Generalized Lepasha FDA Survey Results	70

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction to the Problem

In many developing countries there is unequal access to land which often results in disparities of income and leads to continuing poverty among the majority of the population, despite the efforts of national governments. This problem of continuing poverty in developing countries cannot be correctly assessed by analyzing overall G.N.P. per capita, even if it has shown overall growth in the last few decades (Morawetz, 1977: 12). This is because disparities in per capita income may reveal the uneven distribution of the benefits of development. Morawetz states that "although it is true that per capita income has roughly trebled for some 33 per cent of the people in the developing world during the past 25 years, it is also true that for another 40 per cent the increase in per capita income has been only one or two dollars a year" (Morawetz, 1977: 14). Although the international economic system is characterized by great inequalities in the global distribution of income, which adversely affects developing countries (Lee, 1981: 13); the inequality and disparate incidence of absolute poverty within many individual developing nations may prove to be an even greater constraint to development and the eradication of poverty.

Development theories and practices have often concentrated on the modernization of the economy through industrial growth, and in

many cases, the commercialization of agricultural activities. In some cases the individual government strategies for development have resulted in the use of revenues for the maintenance and expansion of administrative and regulatory activities rather than directing public expenditures towards directly productive activities. Thus, construction of capital intensive 'mega projects' (such as the new airport for Gaborone, Botswana) and other low yielding infrastructural developments are developed, rather than attention being placed on expanding the productive base of the economy. Often the protected modern 'formal' sector has effectively eliminated the traditional mode of production and the associated employment opportunity, with little or no alternative employment being created in their place, resulting in greater real unemployment. Such strategies fall under the 'from above' or 'centre down' approach to development which has its basis "in neo-classical economic theory and its spatial manifestation in the growth centre concept" (Stöhr and Taylor, 1981: 1).

Stöhr (1981: 42) has suggested that 'centre down' development strategies can only function as conceptualized "if at the national level there is both a strong control mechanism (controlling international trade) and a strong internal redistributive mechanism with broad public participation" (Stöhr, 1981: 42). In other words, a country needs to be committed to reduce poverty through egalitarian actions. However, few developing countries have been able to do this so far so that spatial and class inequalities

continue to exist.

An alternative development strategy labelled the 'from below' or 'from within' strategy has gained increased support among many development theorists. "Development 'from below' considers development to be based primarily on maximum mobilization of each areas' natural, human, and institutional resources with the primary objective being the satisfaction of the basic needs of that area" (Stöhr and Taylor, 1981: 1). In order to achieve these objectives, the primary emphasis of development policies should be oriented directly towards the problems of poverty "by stimulating increased production, employment and demand in rural areas" (Rondinelli and Ruddle, 1978: 77). A number of essential components necessary for 'from below' strategies to be successful have been identified. The most important of these are the creation of "egalitarian societal structures and a collective consciousness" and "the provision of broad access to land" (Stöhr, 1981: 64). The provision of broad access to land is necessary to reduce poverty especially when agriculture is the predominant production activity of many developing countries (Friedmann, 1981: 238). However, without a national commitment to reducing poverty it is hardly likely that development policies would be allowed to be motivated and locally controlled 'from below' (Seers, 1977: 4). Unequal access to land often leads to disparities of both power and wealth within many developing nations.

There may be some similarities in the pre-requisites for the

4

success of either the 'centre down' or the 'from below' strategies. Both need national political commitment and broad public participation if either is to be successful. However, these pre-requisites are strongly linked to the political, economic and social make-up of individual nations and their interrelationship with the factors of production.

Griffin has suggested that "many of the policies that governments have adopted have not only been inegalitarian, they have also reduced the level of productive output and its rate of growth" (Griffin, 1974: 254). He feels that the gains of those who have benefited from public policy have been less than the losses of those which government policy discriminates against (ibid, 1974: 254). Following this it is suggested that the lack of real social and political commitment to reduce disparities can be critical in the success or failure of any development strategy.

1.2 Land Reform and Development

Generally, equal access to land and natural resources seems an essential pre-requisite for equalizing income, achieving broad effective demand for basic services and creating rural decision making structures (Stöhr, 1981: 64). In some countries where access to land is unequal, a programme of land reform has been undertaken. Commonly 'land reform' has meant the redistribution of land to benefit the small farmer or landless agricultural worker (Tuma, 1965: 8). More recently, land reform has come to mean any change in

the use of resources to produce agricultural products more efficiently through the reorganization of the land tenure system, such as the consolidation of small dispersed land holdings. Generally, "land reform involves intervention in the prevailing pattern of land ownership, control and usage in order to change the structure of holdings, improve land productivity and broaden the distribution of benefits" (World Bank, 1975: 5). In theory, land reform is pursued in response to political pressure from factors such as increased population, environmental deterioration of a limited land base, or an "ideology of egalitarianism based on the more even distribution of land or income" (World Bank, 1975: 5). Although social or equity concerns are usually put forward by governments as the primary concern for land reform there are very often other considerations focusing more on the national economic use of resources. Where communal lands are being degraded the appropriate reform might involve a programme of supervised co-operative land management without changing the actual distribution of land (World Bank, 1975: 7). Elsewhere, land reform might involve changing the tenancy arrangements with emphasis on providing security of tenure so as to encourage on-farm capital investments or to increase commercial production (ibid, 1975: 7). Therefore, "land reform" does not necessarily imply the increased equitable distribution of access to land for the rural population.

In fact, it has been suggested that land reform policies are often determined by government sources of support, in most cases the


local elite who desire to further their own interests (Griffin, 1974: 172). Therefore, a careful investigation of a nation's land policies is needed so as to assess whether they benefit the majority of the population in both economic and social terms. Within this context, an investigation of the benefits of various land tenure systems may be less useful than the analysis of actual or potential disparities caused by changes in secure access to land. "Access to productive land determines economic opportunities and the social organization of production in pastoral societies such as those of southern Africa" (Koret, 1978: 11). Following this, and in agreement with Stöhr (1981: 64), the retention or introduction of fairly secure access to land and natural resources is essential for rural development. However, the importance of real political commitment to equitable land reform may have been under-estimated in theoretical discussions on development strategies and specifically, land reform policies. Usually the "concentration of control over land provides a power base for many groups in developing countries" (World Bank, 1975: 9). Land ownership tends to be a "symbol of authority and a source of political power, especially where the land owner controls the access of peasants to their only source of security - land" (ibid, 1975: 9).

It is probable that the inequitable distribution of access to land in developing countries has contributed to problems of high unemployment and resulted in high levels of poverty among the population. Traditionally, the land tenure system in pre-colonized

societies was in relative harmony with the mode of production, both socially and physically, although it would be naive to state that this necessarily led to equitable 'ownership' of land among the population. However, the introduction of the capitalist economic system and the commercialization of agriculture has resulted in a change in the traditional mode of production, leading to greater inequalities in access to land without alternative employment opportunities being sufficient to meet demand. This has sometimes resulted in undesirable social and economic problems with the potential to spark political unrest. In addition, the inequitable distribution of land has been suggested as a factor which could lead to reduced national productivity. As Dorner (1971: 11) so aptly states:

Poverty (the massive poverty among the majority of people in the less developed countries) is not only or primarily a welfare and humanitarian problem. It is a problem that has direct and important implications for increased productivity. Supply does not create its own demand under conditions of a highly skewed income distribution. To focus primarily on production widens the gap between rich and poor. It is impossible in many circumstances of development to separate the issues of production and distribution, since distribution measures may be the key to achieving increases in production.

Access to land thus warrants investigation from humanitarian concerns as well as national productivity and, therefore, national self-sufficiency and development planning.



1.3 Statement of Problem

In southern Africa, Botswana (Figure 1.1) has recently undertaken a programme to change the traditional system of land tenure. Officially, the rationale behind the 'land reform' has been the protection of the natural environment, increased agricultural production, and the promotion of greater social-economic equality (Appendix I, p. 92). This land reform, known as the Tribal Grazing Land Policy (TGLP), will undoubtedly have a significant impact on the future development of Botswana. Access to land is still a key to economic opportunities in southern Africa, where the majority of the population live in rural areas (Kowet, 1978. 11). Therefore, disparity in access to land is an indicator of the more general disparities within the society, so the potential impact of any change in the land tenure system needs to be investigated to determine if there actually will be increased equality in access to land.

In some of the districts within Botswana specific land areas have been identified where the TGLP has or will be implemented. In Central District the area chosen is known as the Lepasha First Development Area (Figure 1.1). By analysing the implementation of the TGLP in this area it is hoped to illustrate what impact this 'land reform' is likely to have on local residents and the development of the country in general. The hypothesis to be tested is that the Tribal Grazing Land Policy will reduce inequalities, increase productivity and protect the natural environment. The specific objectives to test the hypothesis are:

- (i) to review the Tribal Grazing Land Policy (TGLP) and its conceptualization by officials, academics and land residents.
- (ii) To analyse the problems and the impact of the TGLP in the Lepasha area, Central District, Botswana.
- (iii) To project the future impact of TGLP on the development of Botswana.

1.4 Organization of the Study

In order to test the hypothesis outlined in this chapter this study has been organized into seven concise chapters. Chapter two is concerned with the physical and historical background which have played on, and continue to play, an important role in the development of Botswana. Chapter three examines the present economic status of the country and indicates a few of the trends which present development efforts have resulted in. Chapter four looks in more detail at the traditional settlement patterns and the system of land tenure while Chapter five outlines and examines the impact of the Governments' present policy on land reform. This latter chapter is supported by Appendix I, the Governments' White Paper on the Tribal Grazing Land Policy. Chapter six is basically a case study of the implementation of the 'land reform' in the Lepasha First Development Area. This chapter examines the demographic, social and economic attributes of the residents in this area and the potential impact of the new policy. A review of the surveys carried out by the author

and others are the primary source of information and have been summarized in Appendix II. Chapter seven presents a summary of the findings.

CHAPTER 2


PHYSICAL AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO THE PROBLEM

2.1 Physical Geography

Botswana is a landlocked, sparsely populated (960,000), semi-arid country of approximately 581,730 square kilometers, located roughly in the centre of the southern African Plateau (Figure 1.1). Elevations vary between 900 and 1200 meters above sea level. The majority of the country (84%), locally known as the 'sandveld' (Figure 2.1), is relatively featureless and covered by fine wind-blown Kalahari sands which are of inherent low fertility. The extensive wide flat plains are now largely stabilized by vegetation. The Okavango River, which originates in Angola, spreads out into a massive delta in northern Botswana. These waters eventually flow via the Boteti River into the Makgadikgadi Pans, which basically forms an inland drainage basin where evaporation dissipates the inflow of water. It has been suggested that this inland drainage system may have once joined the Limpopo River in the south (Campbell, 1982: 16).

The remainder of the country, in the east, is known as the 'hardveld' (Figure 2.1). This region of gentle undulations and sporadic hills (kopje) gradually slopes to the east, is generally more fertile than the sandveld and has a greater variety of terrain units and topography. There are numerous ephemeral rivers in this area although there are no sizable natural permanent sources of surface water.

Figure 2.1 - Vegetation



Source : Ministry of Finance and Development Planning, NDP, 1979-85, p.8.

2.2 Climate

The climate is typical of many savanna areas. The following figures taken at Gaborone show the typical temperature ranges in Botswana.

Gaborone


	Hottest Month (October)		Coolest Month (June)	
	<u>Mean Max.</u>	<u>Mean Min.</u>	<u>Mean Max.</u>	<u>Mean Min.</u>
Wet Year (1966-7)	30.6oC	16.4oC	20.8oC	3.4oC
Dry Year (1961-2)	33.3oC	14.5oC	24.5oC	2.8oC

SOURCE: Cooke, 1982: 4.

The clear skies in the winter season lead to rapid radiational cooling during the night and result in low temperatures. Occasionally frosts occur which may affect crop yields. The combination of generally high temperatures and clear skies lead to high evaporation (up to 7.5 mm/day) and transpiration (up to 5.5 mm/day) (Cooke, 1982: 4). The high temperatures are also a constraint to the growth of certain crops, in particular certain vegetables.

The rainfall is generally low and very erratic, varying both spatially and temporally. It ranges from 700 mm. in the northeast to under 250 mm. in the southwest (Figure 2.2). Figure 2.2 and Table 2.1 indicate the seasonal variability experienced throughout the

Figure 2.2 : Rainfall



Source : Ministry of Finance and Development Planning, NDP, 1979-85, p.4.

Table 2.1: Annual rainfall at selected locations 1965/66-1978/79

Rainfall Station	Millimetres										Weights						
	Long term Seasonal Norm	'65/66	'66/67	'67/68	'68/69	'69/70	'70/71	'71/72	'72/73	'73/74	'74/75	'75/76	'76/77	'77/79	'79/80	Cattle	Crops
Francistown	458	388	803	338	429	526	319	635	265	740	742	587	525	733	429	5	2
Gaborone	514	504	686	493	419	353	532	553	283	698	840	727	738	844	362	1	1
Ghanzi	415	284	663	597	274	264	437	459	307	435	589	362	689	268	2	-	-
Kanye	552	383	970	826	406	373	385	668	347	922	707	836	557	405	224	2	1
Lobatse	569	432	1 021	599	427	391	621	682	470	928	665	892	571	593	363	1	2
Mahalapye	461	294	653	335	391	335	401	601	229	612	595	798	576	637	441	5	2
Maun	476	542	605	579	462	277	317	638	245	1 184	605	388	510	703	291	1	-
Mochudi	496	143	851	424	323	404	497	518	297	711	739	555	691	680	390	1	1
Molepolole	506	354	815	513	439	274	521	638	458	685	912	697	691	781	223	1	1
Palapye	304	232	434	302	470	305	434	558	135	542	632	395	541	382	240	5	2
Scrowe	495	272	765	350	488	259	530	609	243	720	630	551	535	663	219	5	2
Shakawe	574	640	564	572	389	277	550	497	363	932	467	470	627	816	295	-	-
Tsabong	251	188	478	224	168	137	251	409	201	555	288	683	422	374	279	-	-
Tshane	335	424	579	356	295	272	216	420	266	739	439	662	336	309	202	-	-

Weighted average for

crop areas	474	330	762	437	428	360	467	618	291	722	695	662	581	623	332	-	-
cattle areas	451	314	708	404	394	330	419	583	254	718	657	643	549	616	325	-	-

Percentage of long term seasonal norm for:

crop areas	70	161	92	90	87	76	99	130	61	152	147	140	123	131	70	-	-
cattle areas	70	157	90	90	87	73	93	129	56	159	146	143	122	137	72	-	-

- (1) Base on CSO data
- (2) Annual rainfalls are weighted-over crop-growing and cattle-ranching areas
- (3) The year is from July to June.

Source: Ministry of Finance and Development Planning, NDP, 1979-85, p.5

country. The high seasonal variability often results in severe localized shortfalls even when the average rainfall over the country is satisfactory (Ministry of Finance and Development Planning, 1980: 3). Approximately 94% of the total rainfall occurs in the summer months between November and April (Cooke, 1982: 4). However, the distribution of rainfall within these months can be vary erratic. The continuous and well distributed rainfall essential for arable crop production is often not forthcoming. This results in low pasture and cropland yields and the absence of reliable, well distributed water resources.

Another factor which limits the availability of total rainfall is the intensity and duration patterns. Intense rains of short duration are common and tend to run-off as brief surface flows in the eastern hardveld and create potential erosion (and storage) problems. In the sandveld areas these rains are absorbed by the fine sands, but often only infiltrate to a limited depth, because of the low total rainfall and the water is often evapo-transpired prior to further rainfalls. This results in little or no recharge of the ground water.

2.3 Vegetation

The vegetation of Botswana consists primarily of scrub and tree savanna (acacia species) with a significant area of mopane (Colophosperum mopane) in the northeast (Figure 2.1). The mopane tree limits pasture grass production under its canopy but does



provide valuable browse through most of the year plus firewood and good termite resistant building material. The mopane is also the host for the pane worm (Gonimbrasia belira), a large caterpillar which is collected in quantity, dried, and later roasted, fried or eaten raw by some rural Botswana who use it as an important protein source. It is also increasingly marketed to urban centres, even as far away as Johannesburg in the Republic of South Africa.

Generally, the vegetation is of low productivity and the carrying capacity of natural pasture for livestock is very low. The national maximum carrying capacity is one livestock unit (one mature beast) per 8 hectares and the minimum is one livestock unit per 27 hectares (Figure 2.3). Arable crop production is practised in many parts of the east despite the erratic rainfalls which cause fluctuating yields. The average household in the traditional farming sector works about five hectares with a normal yield of less than 300 kilograms of sorghum per hectare although productivity can be improved (Ministry of Finance and Development Planning, 1980: 134). Other grain crops include maize and millet. Multicropping is common, with beans and squash often sown in association with grain crops, thus, real yield per hectare is probably higher than indicated.

2.4 Water Resources

The relatively harsh physical environment in Botswana limits a great deal of potential human activity. The most critical factor is the absence of reliable rainfall and the associated lack of water

Figure 2,3 : Potential Carrying Capacity



ZONE	RAINFALL	CARRYING CAPACITY
1	Above 600mm	8 ha/L.S.U
2	500-600	12"
3	400-500	16"
4	300-400	21"
5	Less than 300	27"

by Field 1975

resources. In the hardveld there is no permanent natural surface water except for the Limpopo River which borders the Republic of South Africa or a few small hillside springs. Subterranean water sources are known to exist in the sand beds of ephemeral rivers, in the thick calcrete layer close to pans or along ancient river courses (Cooke, 1982: 7). In the past, Botswana pastoralists were forced to settle primarily in the east (hardveld) where sufficient quantities of water for livestock could be extracted from these sources by the construction of shallow wells.

The introduction of new technology has enabled the colonization of the previously unusable sandveld and some hardveld areas by pastoralists. Today, mechanically drilled boreholes to groundwater reserves supply an estimated 75 percent of the human and livestock needs (Campbell, 1980: 35). The groundwater is found mainly in joints, fractures, fissures, shears, faults and other secondary openings which tend to mean a sporadic and fluctuating supply (ibid, 1980: 35). The rate of recharge of the groundwater supply has been of concern for a number of years. In the hardveld it has been estimated at one percent of total rainfall, but in the sandveld areas it is possible that there may be little or no recharge under present climatic conditions (Cooke, 1982: 9). The water extracted in sandveld areas is often found to be exceedingly old or 'prehistoric' and to have accumulated during past climatic episodes when rainfall was higher. Other recently developed water sources are at the four dams located on larger ephemeral rivers near Lobatse, Gaborone,

Shashe and Mopipi. These dams provide constant water for either large towns or mining operations. Dams are generally expensive and often encounter sedimentation problems. This limits their potential use for many future (especially small) developments.

The semi-arid climate and poor soils of Botswana present a formidable challenge to the population. The low productivity of the environment limits the intensive use of much of the country. Over exploitation of natural resources has already led to erosion and environmental degradation in some parts of the country. Primarily overgrazing has led to substantial water erosion in hardveld areas and some wind erosion in sandveld areas. Without proper conservation methods it is even possible that widespread desertification could occur in the future. These environmental problems in conjunction with the high population growth rates (estimated at 3 percent per year) pose a considerable challenge for the development of a long-term policy for social and economic development.

2.5 Historical Background

There are two ethnically distinct groups of people within Botswana, the Bantu people and the Basarwa (or Bushmen). The Basarwa are usually considered to be the original inhabitants of the whole of Southern Africa. The historic origins of the Basarwa are cloudy but "Smithfield" tools dating back 11,000 years and "Wilton" tools dating back 8,000 years have been found in association with egg-shell beads, ground stones, stick weights and decorated home implements at the

sites of rock paintings and engravings (Clark, 1970: 165). It is possible that the people who made these tools were the ancestors to the present day Basarwa. Today it is estimated that there are over 50,000 Basarwa living in and around Botswana, although through acculturation and intermixing, only 3,000 are probably living traditionally as hunter-gatherers (Campbell, 1980: 98). However, many Basarwa maintain their distinctive 'Khoisan' language and are often physically distinctive from the Bantu majority. It appears that the Bantu people originated from North Central Africa and arrived at the Limpopo approximately 2,000 years ago, or over 1,200 years before the first Europeans. About 1400 AD the Western Sotho people settled in the more environmentally favourable areas of Eastern Botswana. By the 19th century Tswana, Kalanga, Yei, Herero and other pastoral tribes had settled all of the more favourable climatic regions of Botswana leaving only the Central and Southern Kalahari sandveld inhabited by the Basarwa (Wily, 1979: 3).

Marks (1980: 12) hypothesizes that, as the Bantu or (in Botswana) 'Batswana' population spread throughout southern Africa, it is probable that there was little initial conflict with the indigenous Basarwa. The Basarwa hunter-gatherers had relatively low population densities and no large permanent settlements. The key to their society and survival was "mobility" and the well developed knowledge of their fragile environment. The then incoming 'Batswana' people were pastoralists and subsistence agriculturalists. It may be concluded that their society was more administratively complex and

tended to support higher population densities by using superior technology wherever the environment permitted (i.e., where water resources permitted). It is also probable that when the 'Batswana' settlements reached a certain population they would fragment, with one or more sections migrating to a different area to establish a new settlement. This would have been necessary to reduce overgrazing and maintain ample crop land fertility. A constantly expanding frontier (or hostilities) was probably needed to maintain the equilibrium between human livestock population growth and the fragile land resource base. As these settlements colonized new areas conflict between the Botswana and Basarwa may have developed as the increasing cattle and human population densities reduce wildlife numbers and the supply of wild foods. The Basarwa would then have been forced to withdraw, challenge the Batswana pastoralists, or be assimilated. The present situation of generally low Basarwa population densities and hunter-gatherers alongside 'settled' cattle post workers indicates that all three strategies for survival were attempted at various times. The expansion, conflict, assimilation, withdrawal, expansion etcetera, continued until the Kalahari - 'Sandveld' was reached, where water was unavailable (using traditional techniques) in sufficient quantities to support the Batswana livestock. It is suggested that this single factor, an environmental constraint of limited water supply, preserved traditional Basarwa society in the Kalahari sandveld.

On the fringe of the Kalahari a new relationship developed

between the Batswana and the Basarwa populations. For example, in Tswana custom the Basarwa who were assimilated became the servants of the nobility. They would carry out household work, tend cattle, help with the crops and hunt for their "masters" but would receive little or no compensation. The Basarwa and their descendents would be inheritable by the responsible family who would have sole control and access to their services. Batswana custom forbade a Basarwa man to marry a Batswana woman, but it did not forbid Batswana men having children with Basarwa women, although the offspring would not be recognized as Batswana nor be able to inherit property (Schapera, 1938: 252). It has been documented that the Basarwa were, in fact, the "serfs" of many Batswana tribal groups (Schapera, 1938: 254), even until very recently (Kuper, 1970: 41). The historical differences between these two groups, although greatly modified, can still be identified today and has led to unequal benefits of development.

Prior to external colonial contact, the economy of the area was basically self-sufficient with only a limited amount of external trade. The trade was usually (except for the Basarwa) between groups of people with similar modes of production. Each tribal group had its own territory and was, in theory, politically independent, each managing its own affairs under the leadership of the chief (Kgosi) whose position was hereditary (Schapera, 1970: 4). "The Chief was both lawgiver and judge; he regulated the allocation of land, the annual cycle of agricultural tasks" and many other activities in war, trade and religion (Schapera, 1970: 4). "Politically, Chiefs were

dependent on their subjects through a 'parliamentary' system called the kgotla which functioned as a check on the power and authority of the Chiefs (Kowet, 1978: 18). As there was a tendency of free movement from one tribal group to another it followed that a good Chief would attract more subjects, and the more subjects the Chief had, the more was his security and power assured (Kowet, 1978: 18). Thus as long as Chiefs' followers were a function of his wealth and power, it was wise to distribute the use of natural resources (land) as widely as possible to tribal members to secure their continued support (Kowet, 1978: 18).

By 1885 all tribes except the Batawana in the north east of the country had been in contact with Europeans for half a century or more (Schapera, 1970: 5). Europeans came first as explorers, missionaries and traders and eventually as settlers. The advance of the Boer settlers caused resentment among the Batswana leaders who petitioned the British Government for protection. This was supported by the British government, who created the Bechuanaland protectorate partly because of its desire to limit the expansion of the Boer community but principally because of the strategic value of the area (Sillery, 1952; Sillery, 1965). The resulting external contacts affected the traditional mode of production, primarily by introducing new technology and the capitalist monetary system. Significantly, the process of colonial penetration created a land shortage which was determined not only by the total land available "but also by the manner of distribution and, consequently by the control over (and

access to) the remaining land" (Kowet, 1978: 18).

The British favoured indirect rule which involves ruling as far as possible, through the use of tribal Chiefs or other traditional rulers (Morrison, 1976: 13). These people came to act as 'agents' of the British colonial administration. It was suggested that this policy preserved and even intensified the tribal and social divisions by reducing the need for compromise between ruler and ruled, and, more importantly, led to greater social differentiation by reducing the tribal majority's control over the Chiefs. The old pattern where political checks could be exercised through the parliamentary Kgotla system became inoperative once the Chiefs were now protected by the colonial government (Schapera, 1938; Kowet, 1978: 18). This gave the Chiefs and their supporters the opportunity, through their control over land, to acquire increasingly disproportionate shares over the tribal wealth (later national wealth) amassed in the form of livestock, water sources and capital goods.

This elite group has also been able to acquire positions of political and administrative power in the newly created modern institutions as a function of traditional social position, wealth and education. In three southern districts it was found that 29 per cent of all families had 25 cattle or more, whereas only 12 per cent had over 50 head (Holm, 1972: 87 in Picard, 1979: 7). "However, among the District Councillors surveyed, 62 per cent had more than 25 cattle while 42 per cent had more than 50 cattle" (Ibid). Personal observation suggests that many of the local political structures, for

example the District Land Boards, are composed of members possessing an even greater percentage owning over 50 head of cattle. The significance of the 'decision makers' also being the economic elite will become apparent in the following chapters, especially when vested interests in livestock are considered. An awareness of the social changes which have occurred enables a better understanding of the present society and, therefore, supports a comprehensive analysis of present development efforts. It should be remembered that the tendencies towards class polarization and social inequalities which have become increasingly evident (Cliffe and Moorson, 1979: 38) are a result of the gradual change from a 'traditional' mode of production to a 'capitalist' mode of production due to colonial penetration.

CHAPTER 3
NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

3.1 Introduction


In 1885 the High Commissioner indicated that Britain's intention with regard to the administration of Bechuanaland (Botswana) was to do as little as possible (Colclough and McCarthy, 1980: 27). Throughout the next eighty years of British rule this point of view was maintained such that at independence Botswana "was worse off in terms of both social and directly productive infrastructure than any other ex-British territory in Africa" (Colclough and McCarthy, 1980: 28). At independence in 1966, the main objectives of the government were perceived as the rapid growth of the economy and the provision of the then practically non-existent social services and physical infrastructure. Many of these objectives had been met with real growth rates sometimes being in excess of 20 percent (Colclough and McCarthy, 1980: 57) and significant improvements in social services and physical infrastructure (ibid, 1980: 107). Revenues for these developments were secured mainly through the re-negotiation of the Customs Union Agreement with the Republic of South Africa, increased agricultural production (primarily because of favourable climatic factors) and, to a lesser extent, from the growing mining industry (ibid, 1980: 107).

3.2 Development Strategy

The Botswana Government's development strategy has led to an increasing dependence on foreign imports (Figure 3.1). Trade deficits have increased over 200 per cent from 56 Millions of units of Account in 1973 to 113 Millions of units of Account in 1978 (Figure 3.1). Also, of persistent social and political concern is the increasing economic dependence on the Republic of South Africa. Imports from the Republic of South Africa (R.S.A.) have absolutely increased from 69.2% in 1973 to 84.7% in 1978 while exports to R.S.A. have decreased from 18.7% in 1973 to 13.6% in 1978 (Ministry of Finance and Development Planning, 1980: 30). The composition of imports and exports shown in Table 3.1 indicates the usual reliance of developing countries on imported industrial goods and Botswana's increasing dependence on foreign foodstuffs. The importance of the food import and export figures are often overlooked and understated. This is primarily because of the nature of food imports and exports. Botswana exports high-value, low bulk meat products and imports substantial amounts of low-value, high bulk grain products, as well as milk, fruit and vegetables. This creates a dependency on both secure export markets for meat products and import markets for grain products (which fulfill a large proportion of the population's nutritional requirements). Thus, the present situation is not conducive to national self-reliance in food production.

Along with the increasing dependence on foreign food imports are the high rates of unemployment and underemployment found

Figure 3.1 Imports and Exports at current prices 1973-1978



Source: Central Statistics Office

Notes: Up to 30 April 1977, 1.00 UA (Units of Account) = P1.00. Between 30 April 1977 and the end of 1978, 1.00 UA = P0.95, approximately.

TABLE 31. IMPORTS OF GOODS 1973-78 (Duty Inclusive, c.i.f.)
(by value in '000 Units of Accounts)

Type of Goods	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978
Food, beverage & Tobacco	18,226	21,178	28,989	35,534	47,504	56,046
Fuel	6,199	13,710	16,777	19,184	25,327	27,120
Chemicals & Rubber Products	6,926	8,953	10,503	14,044	18,775	22,355
Wood & Paper Products	3,716	5,091	6,520	6,440	3,135	9,349
Textiles & Footwear	9,788	13,543	16,345	21,038	25,571	29,294
Metals & Metal Products	11,440	10,158	15,781	13,125	22,844	35,491
Machinery & Electrical Equipment	23,764	14,372	16,648	20,775	31,324	47,246
Vehicles & Transport Equipment	16,492	19,441	21,648	21,198	24,183	38,032
Other	18,413	18,972	25,738	30,047	35,941	41,457
Total Imports	114,963	125,418	159,288	181,385	239,605	307,090

Note: Up to 10 April 1977, 1,00 Unit of Account = P0,95
approximately until February, 1979.

Export of Goods 1973-1978						
Type of Goods	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978
Meat & Meat Products	30,764	31,912	36,446	43,001	42,559	28,557
Animals	136	106	103	171	660	155
Hides & Skins	1,594	1,625	1,497	3,128	3,664	2,406
Diamonds	20,046	30,135	32,122	37,487	48,364	79,263
Copper-nickel matte	-	8,258	21,997	51,768	41,162	52,591
Textiles	1,503	1,656	2,473	6,141	6,282	8,560
Other	5,157	8,297	10,402	11,476	13,062	21,144
Total Exports	59,200	81,990	105,040	153,172	156,653	192,676

SOURCE: Statistics Unit, Department of Customs and Excise, MFDP, 1980, p. 30.

throughout Botswana. The twin evils of unemployment and underdevelopment mean that 44% of the available working time in Botswana is unused (Lipton, 1978: 13). Lipton (1978: 23) states that 13,000 work opportunities will be needed each year between 1979 and 1988 just to keep up with the natural increase in persons available for work totalling 35,500 extra work opportunities per year until 1988 to eliminate unused working time, or often, unemployment. This will probably be one of Botswana's greatest challenges in the next decade.

TABLE 3.2: CITIZEN WORK YEARS IN BOTSWANA, 1978*

(Maximum estimates; assumes typical climate; 240 day person year.)

Non-freehold crops	35,000
Non-freehold livestock	60,000
Freehold farms	6,500
Hunting and gathering	5,600
Other rural: informal	17,500
Formal non-farm	64,500
Domestic service, urban	6,000
Other urban informal	6,000
	<u>201,000</u>

SOURCE: Lipton, 1978, p. 18.

*Citizen work years, 8 hour day, 240 days/year, available in each sector.

Table 3.2 indicates the approximate division of citizen work years in Botswana and illustrates the importance of the various sectors. Rural employment makes up nearly two-thirds of the total citizen work years and typically consists of production activities. In comparison, at least one-third of the formal non-farm activities are in 'non-productive', although often necessary, government and

educational positions (Lipton, 1978: 17). Also, it should be noted that the infrastructural formal (primarily urban) sector used up 75% of Botswana's gross fixed income in 1973-77 and required P12,800 for each extra permanent work place created, whereas the directly productive, often the rural informal sector, used only 25% of gross fixed investment and required only P3,000 per permanent work place created (ibid). Thus, the importance of the rural sector in providing potential work for the population is apparent. However, the high population growth rates (3 per cent per annum) and the lack of sufficient new cash employment opportunities in the rural areas have created large scale rural to urban migration. Contributing to such migrations is the disparity in service between rural and urban areas (Ministry of Local Government and Lands, 1979: 5) and the possibility of earning higher wages. Unfortunately, "if the number of people moving to the towns continues to exceed the growth of formal sector employment, the problem of urban poverty is likely to get worse" (Ministry of Finance and Development Planning, 1980: 23). In Botswana's Daily News, November 30, 1981 Patrick Balopi M.P. noted the government's concern for rural-urban migration because of the potential social, political and economic disturbance. In Gaborone the total proportion of unemployed heads of households is expected to rise from 3 per cent in 1975, to 14-21 per cent in 1985 (Ministry of Local Government and Lands, 1977a: 97). In Selebi-Phikwe, "after 1981 no additional large scale employment is predicted" although population projections indicate 4-6 per cent

yearly growth (Ministry of Local Government and Lands, 1977b: pp. 28, 30). In agreement with Mudzinganyama (1980: 293), rural-urban migration can have positive influences on both urban areas and to the migrants themselves. However, when there are absolutely no further employment opportunities, formal or informal, a decision on where and how to create further employment must be made. It is the contention of this study that investments in the rural areas will be of greatest benefit in providing employment at this point in Botswana's development. It is interesting to note that "the experience of scores of countries shows that a literate, frustrated army of urban unemployed contains the beginnings, not of radical reform, but of despair, disease, anarchy and crime" (Lipton, 1978: 8).

3.3 Distribution of Government Expenditure

One of the main causes of high unemployment and the external dependence of foodstuffs may have been the lack of agricultural development and poor distribution of government expenditure. Capital expenditure by location and/or main beneficiary group, as illustrated in Table 3.3, shows the high concentration of government expenditures in the urban areas especially considering the fact that 'communications' primarily benefit urban areas. If these expenditures are considered in light of the 80 per cent rural population, it is evident that they are highly skewed in favour of urban regions and concentrated on services rather than production activities (Table 3.4). An indication of this is the 38.4 percent of

TABLE 33 CAPITAL EXPENDITURE BY LOCATION AND/IF MAIN BENEFICIARY GROUP, 1966/7-1976/7
P Millions (percentages)

	<u>1966/7</u>	<u>1968/9</u>	<u>1970/1</u>	<u>1972/3</u>	<u>1974/5</u>	<u>1976/7</u>
Rural	1.44 (26)	0.85 (25)	1.39 (16)	1.63 (5)	12.31 (33)	12.71 (27)
Urban	2.79 (49)	2.12 (64)	5.34 (63)	25.39 (85)	13.67 (37)	14.15 (33)
Communi- cations	1.43 (25)	0.37 (11)	1.80 (21)	2.86 (10)	11.00 (30)	17.20 (40)
TOTAL	5.66	3.34	8.53	29.88	37.00	43.17

SOURCE: Annual Statement of Accounts (RB, 1967-RB, 1977 from Colclough and McCarthy, 1980, p. 93.

TABLE 34: STRUCTURE OF TOTAL PUBLIC EXPENDITURE

<u>Sector</u>	<u>Percentage of total public expenditure</u>	
	<u>1976/77</u>	<u>1978/79</u>
Roads	15.2	15.2
Other transport	7.8	9.1
P. and T.	1.7	2.3
Electricity, water	7.9	3.5
General administration, defence	16.7	17.9
Urban construction	13.7	10.2
Storage	-	.7
Education	18.4	13.0
Health	8.1	7.1
Agriculture	7.9	3.3
Commerce, industry	0.6	2.5
Conservation, wildlife	0.5	0.7
Mining	1.5	1.3

SOURCE: Financial Statements, Tables and estimates of Consolidated and Development Fund Revenues 1978/79, Gaborone, pp. 8-10, from Lipton, Vol. II, 1978, p. 149.

total formal employment arising from government activities compared to this sector's relatively low 17.3 percent contribution to Gross Domestic Product (Ministry of Finance and Development Planning, 1980: 17). Furthermore, there is a great difference between average levels of income and median levels of income within the country. According to the Rural Income Distribution Survey, nearly three-quarters of all households earned less than the annual average wage of Pula 340 (Ministry of Finance and Development Planning, 1980: 20). For example, the Government's lowest paid wage is over P700 a year in comparison to the average per capita income of P340 (Ibid, 1980: 20). People in 'formal' employment usually earn far above the average (Ibid, 1980: 20).

The relatively low expenditure on the agricultural sector (Table 3.4) is focused mainly on the development of the livestock industry as indicated in Table 3.5.

TABLE 3.5: ANALYSIS OF PLANNED AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT EXPENDITURE

	<u>% 1976-81</u>
Animal Health	10.51
Livestock Development	50.62
Arable Development	9.25
Research	9.14
Manpower	5.28
Other	15.20


SOURCE: Ministry of Finance and Development Planning, 1980, p. 167.

However, the ownership of cattle is highly uneven (Figure 3.2). "Non-cattle owning households comprise about 45 per cent of all rural households, or over one-third of rural households actually engaged in agriculture; a further 40 per cent of rural households own up to 50 head each, accounting for one-quarter of the national head while the remaining 15 per cent...own three-quarters of the national herd" (Colclough and McCarthy, 1980: 112). This has led to a great disparity of income between 'so-called' rural households. It should be noted that the richest rural households usually have strong linkages to urban centres and, in fact, may have some members permanently employed and often living in urban centres. As previously discussed this elite group controls a significant proportion of many of the factors of production nationally. They tend to own water sources and large numbers of cattle, therefore having 'de facto' control over large areas of land. Often this group has a formal wage position, usually in the civil service, and has traditional as well as present political power.

There are two outstanding features which have been documented by the Rural Income Distribution Survey. First, "the distribution of rural income is highly unequal, as is the distribution of cattle, and second, there are many households that are very poor, not merely in comparison to the elite, but in relation to minimal subsistence requirements" (Ministry of Finance Development Planning, 1980: 20). Therefore, the unequal distribution of cattle could be a major factor leading to the unequal distribution of income among rural households


Figure 3.2 : Distribution of Cattle Ownership

Lorenz Curve The proportion of all rural cattle that were owned by each group of rural households



Source : Central Statistics Office, Rural Income Distribution Survey, (1974/75), p.113.

Figure 3.3: Income (by source) for Rural Households



Source: Central Statistics Office, Rural Income Distribution Survey, (1974/75), p.102-103.

(Figure 3.3). This suggests that the majority of funds which are directed towards the agricultural sector, and which go to the livestock sector (Table 3.5), really benefit and even subsidize the small segment of large livestock owners. Thus, the government's focus on commercial livestock development may accelerate the impoverishment of rural households and lead to increased disparities in rural household earnings.

These trends indicate that the policies adopted by the government for rural development have not been successful. Disparities have increased in the rural areas while food imports have risen. A thorough investigation would be needed to identify why public expenditures have been directed to the various sectors and the impact of the numerous policies which are presently being implemented. However this investigation, as previously indicated, will limit itself to one policy dealing with land and cattle ownership and the potential impact on rural development.


CHAPTER 4
CUSTOMARY LAND TENURE AND SETTLEMENT

4.1 Customary Land Tenure

Botswana had been divided into three major types of land tenure zones prior to independence; communal (tribal), freehold, and since the late nineteenth century, state lands (Figure 4.1). Freehold land is held under private deed, primarily by white settlers, stateland is held by the government and occasionally allocated to individuals on leasehold, while communal land has been under customary law. This study will primarily consider recent developments on what has been called communal or tribal lands, where the majority of the people live.

The customary land tenure system is theoretically based on the communal ownership of land. However, customary law makes a distinction between title and the right of possession and use (S. Khama in Kowet, 1978: 66). All tribal members hold communal title to land but not necessarily the rights of possession and use. "The rights of use and possession are qualified rights because they are subject to the overriding right of the chief, in whom the title rests for the whole community" (S. Khama in Kowet, 1978: 66). Therefore, a chief could decide (often in conjunction with the Kgotla) who should possess and use what amount of land in which location. The administration of communal land was carried out by the delegation of land related duties to junior chiefs and headmen.

Figure 4,1 : Botswana Land Tenure Zones, 1974



Source: Smit, P. 1970: 34

Control of these subordinates was mainly reliant on the economic rewards occurring to such a position through preferential access to land. The privilege of the chiefs lay in their privilege to choose the largest and most fertile share of the land (Kowet, 1978: 66). This control over land was central to the system of political authority and the accumulation of wealth and prestige.

The traditional socio-political organization of the society as well as environmental constraints resulted in a spatially separated tripartite settlement pattern which is still evident today. There were three basic types of land use: the village residential areas, the arable lands and the cattle post grazing area. Traditionally, households enjoying tribal 'citizenship' were entitled to allotments of land for residential purposes and arable crop production, plus the use of a village or ward grazing area.

The tribal capitals and larger villages were the centres for political and social life in which all important gatherings and meetings were held (Colclough and McCarthy, 1980: 8). It was (and still is) in these villages that the distribution, allocation and use of land was decided. Within these villages residential plots were allocated to family groups by the chief or appointed ward headman. Each allocation was physically demarcated and recognized as being in the possession of an individual household. Under customary land tenure the individual would then have a clear right to the demarcated land within the community for as long as he desired the land subject only to the greater right still possessed by the chief. Most members

of the tribe also possessed arable lands relatively close to the villages. Arable lands (masimo) were also allocated to individual households and were physically demarcated giving individual rights to a specific area of land (again, subject to the greater right of the chief). These arable lands, similar to residential plots, could be inherited or transferred, subject to the approval of the chief (along with the kgotla). If the land was not used for a set period of time (usually five years), the local chief or headman had the right to re-allocate the land, although this did not often occur.

The cattle post grazing areas were usually located in the hinterland areas peripheral to the arable lands. This was to avoid crop damage by grazing cattle and to secure adequate grazing. The system of land tenure in grazing areas was significantly different from either the village residential plots or arable land fields.

Primarily, individual segments of grazing land were not allocated to individual households. Instead, cattle posts (point locations where livestock were kraaled overnight) were allocated to individuals within communally utilized "communal" grazing land. "Every grazing area had a special overseer, usually the titular ward headman or a deputy, whose permission had to be sought and obtained by any outsider wishing to place a cattle post there" (Schapera, 1970: 98). Once admitted, the applicant was theoretically free to graze his animals wherever he could, provided he did not build his cattle post too close to others (Schapera, 1970: 98). However, this oversimplified land use system was only followed in practice when

considering easily accessible and well distributed water sources.

The physical development of man-made water sources (wells or dams) modified the theoretically equal access to communal grazing. Man-made water sources belonged to the person(s) who constructed them. Thus, the allocation, possession and development of a water source is the most significant factor in secure access to grazing land in an environment where water is scarce. Many man-made water sources are difficult to construct and increasingly possible only with capital intensive modern technology. The possible differential accumulation of wealth for a select few with preferential access to capital and labour is evident in what has theoretically been labelled as 'communal' grazing land.

4.2 Settlement Patterns and Agriculture

During the growing season people generally move from their village residence to the arable land areas, although today some households possess only one permanent residence, often at the 'lands', indicating a breakdown of the traditional tripartite settlement system (Silitshena, 1977: 5). Relatively large fields are prepared for planting dryland crops through the use of draught oxen, although some tractors are now in use. Therefore, an important link is established between cattle and arable production; such that access to oxen for ploughing is essential for most arable production (Colclough and McCarthy, 1980: 110). However, as illustrated in Figure 3.2 the distribution of cattle in Botswana is highly skewed.

These disparities of cattle ownership are not a new phenomenon and have an historical explanation, mainly that chiefs and local headmen were able to acquire a considerable number of cattle by capitalizing on their positions. Also, during periods of drought, percentage losses in large herds are not as disastrous as equal percentage losses in small herds explaining the tendency for the increasing concentration of cattle ownership by a small segment of the population.

Traditionally, there was a limited system of balancing out these inequalities in cattle ownership. This system was based on a large cattle owner 'sharing out' (mafisa) his cattle to non-owners who became responsible for their management and who could use the cattle for draught, milk and transportation (Colclough and McCarthy, 1980: 113). The non-cattle owner traditionally received virtually all of the benefits of private ownership from the cattle, on a day to day basis, except the prestige of ownership. The cattle owner benefited by reducing his risks, accomplished by spreading his livestock over a greater spatial area during periods of drought (Colclough and McCarthy, 1980: 113) and by acquiring virtually free labour, thus reducing personal herd maintenance costs.

The traditional 'sharing out' system has been fragmented and no longer ensures the wide distribution of access to cattle, primarily due to the commercialization of the livestock industry. The monetary value now attached to livestock is not conducive to the traditional system of 'sharing out' cattle as this practice results in reduced

animal condition (by using them for draught) and therefore, market value. Increasingly, non-stock owning families do not have access to cattle for draught purposes. Instead, they must outlay money or labour to plough. The wages earned in the rural sector are very low, especially in comparison to the cost of ploughing. The monetary cost of paying for the ploughing of a one hectare field (up to P25) is so high compared to the market value of production (270 kg. of sorghum valued at P34) that arable farming is hardly profitable without cattle ownership (personal observation). A mixed agricultural enterprise has other advantages, mainly that of providing some security against the extreme variability of rainfall (Colclough and McCarthy, 1980: 110). Livestock rearing, which depends more on total rainfall in any year than on its seasonal variation, is a more resilient activity in the face of climatic uncertainty than is arable production. "Nevertheless, crop production is still vital for many of the poorer people and it is the single most common productive activity" (Colclough and McCarthy, 1980: 110).

Today the larger commercially oriented cattle posts (over 100 cattle) are located at a distance from arable lands, typically in the sandveld, and equipped with a diesel driven pump and reservoir. These cattle posts are usually owned (at least in the Central, district) by wealthier individuals who are 'absentee' for a large part of the year. Typically they are managed by the owners' poorer relatives or a trusted friend for a defined wage. Herdmen are often

Basarwa (Bushmen), who receive little or no wage, although some food and access to milk is received. The owners of these larger cattle posts increasingly perceive their herd as a form of interest earning capital, in which cattle have a potential commercial value, as well as the traditional association of power and prestige. The smaller cattle herd owners typically own, share, rent, etcetera, access to a water source. It is usually poorly equipped and located near, if not within, overcrowded, arable land areas. The owner is often the manager and resident at or near the cattle post for a significant period of the year. Probably the most notable difference between the small and large cattle owners is the comparatively large amount of arable lands ploughed by the former and their comparatively large contribution to national self sufficiency in grain production (Figure 3.3).

In summary, the government's emphasis on the development of the commercial livestock industry within the agricultural sector has increased the potential for disparities to occur in the rural areas. Wealthy, commercially oriented cattle post owners have been able to acquire the capital necessary to expand their livestock operations primarily through the acquisition and development of new water sources and, therefore, expand their grazing area. This has given individuals 'de facto' land ownership over extensive areas under the customary land tenure system. However, the 'de facto' grazing land control has only limited security. A reduction in the arbitrary distance between water sources (usually taken as 8 km, to 4 km) would

enable additional water source development by other livestock owners. This would effectively reduce the area of land held ('de facto' ownership) around the established cattle posts. This suggests that established cattle post owners have a vested interest in limiting the development of adjacent water sources and gaining the security of 'de jure' land ownership over their present 'de facto' ownership of land. Any change in the security of land tenure will have important implications for future access to land among the population.

CHAPTER 5

THE TRIBAL GRAZING LAND POLICY

5.1 Introduction

The Tribal Grazing Land Policy (TGLP), outlined in this Chapter, results in an increase in the security of land tenure and proposes that environmental, economic and social benefits will occur. An examination of the Tribal Grazing Land Policy enables an understanding of the rationale behind the proposed 'Land Reform' and suggests that the policy may in fact have a negative impact on the well-being of many rural residents.

5.2 Administrative Change

Significant changes occurred in the formal structure of land administration soon after independence (Calclough and MacCarthy, 1980: 36), although the tribal political system continues to exert a great deal of influence at the local level (Vengroff, 1977: 45). This co-existence of modern and traditional political structures causes duality within the administration process, and has contributed to a low level of political culture and political socialization at the 'grassroots' level (Dube, 1980: 19). Nevertheless, the Tribal Land Act (1968) terminated most of the powers that traditional leaders exercised over land and transferred the title for land to the state. The national government's control over land became a mandate of the Ministry of Local Government and Land with the direct

responsibility being vested in the newly formed District Land Boards which were directed to recognize previous land allocations. The latter organization was "to hold the tribal land in trust (for the people) and allocate it impartially according to either Customary or Common law" (Ministry of Local Government and Land, 1978: 2). These Land Boards are generally composed of the Chief or the Chief's appointee, two Council members and two members appointed from the community by the Ministry of Local Government and Lands.

Administrative problems and the defiance of Land Board authority has occurred and led to the Interministerial Committee Report on Land Board Operations (Ministry of Local Government and Land, 1978: 9). This report recommended increased administrative capability, better inter-departmental communications and re-assessment of responsibilities and procedures.

Other 'local' authorities involved with the land are the Council, District Administration, Tribal Authority and Regional Agricultural Office. The number of departments involved, their diverse objectives and poor linkages often leads to confrontation between departmental policy objectives. In addition, grandiose projects developed primarily by one local authority may create an impossible work demand on another department, eventually leading to the project's failure. However, the present organizational structure can function if responsibilities are defined more rigorously and lines of inter-departmental communications established.

5.3 Land Tenure 'Reform'

In 1971 a government sponsored conference came to the conclusion, based almost entirely on technical reports and neglecting the social and economic aspects of land use, that sound environmental conservation measures were needed and necessitated a radical land reform (Picard, 1979: 15). In 1973 the Vice President stated that "the Government is now convinced that in order to allow stock owners to use improved management practices and thereby increase revenue from the livestock industry, (that) fencing under certain conditions should be permitted (Hansard, 1973: 115). In agreement with Picard, the government's solution to the ecological problems seemed to be to the advantage of the socio-economic elites (Picard, 1979: 16). No mention was made about land redistribution or the fate of non-stock holders who comprise 45 per cent of the rural population. It was not until later that one of the official reasons to change the land tenure system included the need to help the poorer farmer (ibid, 1979: 18).

The National Policy on Tribal Grazing Land (TGLP) approved in 1975 was a comprehensive statement of the government intention in respect to grazing land and, more generally, to the entire land tenure system in Botswana (see Appendix I). The government stated that a land reform policy could:

- (i) reduce overgrazing and degradation of the veld;
- (ii) assist in the growth and commercialization of the livestock industry (to achieve greater production);

- (iii) promote the greater equality of incomes in rural areas. (Appendix I, p. 92).

To achieve the above aims two objectives were outlined:

- (a) To make grazing control, better range management and increased productivity possible. The improved management system must start with fenced areas and land over which exclusive rights are recognized. Therefore, under certain conditions, groups and individuals must be granted exclusive rights to land.
- (b) To safeguard the interests of those who own only a few cattle or none at all. (Appendix I, p. 97).

Critics of the Tribal Grazing Land Policy predicted that granting exclusive rights over land could lead to even greater disparities in cattle ownership and, therefore, income in rural areas. Many felt that a land enclosure policy could leave non-stockholders or small stockholders virtually landless (Picard, 1979: 22). The rationale behind the criticisms was the requirements outlined in the policy to meet the stated objectives (Appendix I, p. 97). To achieve its objectives there is the need for "massive application of (scarce) resources of capital and expertise" such as physical equipment, supporting infrastructure and technical, managerial and administrative knowledge (Weiner, 1977: 44). These 'resources' are virtually absent in rural areas (with the exception of a few commercial cattle post operations) and result in the need to 'import' these development resources by the government. A number of important questions have been directed toward the policy in respect to the allocation of these development inputs:

- (i) Which groups of rural people will be the final "consumers"?

- (ii) How is access to and control over imported assets obtained?
- (iii) What are the social, economic and opportunity costs of using these assets?
- (iv) What are the utility functions and time preferences?
- (v) What is the relationship between importer (the government) and consumer? (Weiner, 1977: 44).


Although potential problems created by the TGLP were identified early in policy formulation, the government chose to overlook possible implications. Interestingly, "members of the Botswana Democratic Party, like senior level administrators are representative of an educated cattle owning elite which controls much of the cattle industry and related sectors of the domestic economy" (Parsons in Picard, 1979: 5).

5.4 Policy Proposals

To implement the objectives of the Tribal Grazing Land Policy, three types of tribal land use zones were initially proposed (Appendix I, p. 97). These are the 'Commercial' farming areas, the 'Communal' grazing areas and the 'Reserved' areas. Each of these zones were mapped and are illustrated in Figure 5.1.

Commercial zones were to be primarily utilized by groups of individuals holding exclusive rented land rights to fenced ranches for livestock production. Traditional land rights were to be cancelled. The areas zoned commercial were typically those with a relatively low population density and few cultivated fields, typically where water sources were well distributed or absent. These

Figure 5.1 ; Botswana Land Tenure Zones, 1980



Source : Ministry of Finance and Development Planning,
NDP, 1979-85, p.135.

criteria were primarily met in the sandveld areas. It was mistakenly assumed that there were vast areas of underdeveloped unutilized land in the central Kalahari which could also be developed as part of the commercial area. The limited area not utilized for livestock and most of the zone mapped commercial was found to be occupied by significant numbers of indigenous hunter-gatherers, the Basarwa.


The areas zoned Communal were those which had comparatively high population densities, a substantial area of cultivated land and where water sources were often closely clustered. The agricultural system tended to be one of mixed subsistence in comparison to the commercial livestock orientation of the Commercial zone. In Communal areas the customary land tenure system was to remain virtually unchanged. However the Tribal Grazing Land Policy suggested that overgrazing would be reduced through the reduction in cattle numbers and stock control measures (Figure 5.2). It was proposed that people with large herds would move to the commercial area and establish a ranch.

Reserved zones were to be located in large areas of unused land (thought to exist). This zone was to be, as the name implies, reserved for use by future generations. Other land use zones in tribal areas were later added, namely Wildlife Management Areas and Reserved for Special Purposes Areas. An example of the latter is an area reserved for future mine development and transportation corridors.


Figure 5.2 illustrates how the government perceived the new

FIGURE 5.2: NATIONAL POLICY FOR TRIBAL GRAZING LAND

WHAT IS HAPPENING NOW



WHAT WILL HAPPEN INSTEAD



* To be determined for the various Land Boards areas by the individual Land Board in consultation with the Ministries of Agriculture and Local Government and Lands.

system of land allocation. A critique of the figure indicates a number of loopholes. First, the basic premise of the Tribal Grazing Land Policy is that overgrazing is taking place in communal areas. Therefore, the Communal area boundaries should be extended or 'made bigger' than they presently are (Appendix I, p. 102). However, if they were sufficiently large to reduce overgrazing, there would be little or no land remaining for the commercial or reserved zones. Second, even if livestock are transferred from Communal to Commercial areas the reduction in stocking rate will only be temporary, as natural population increase will quickly replace losses, unless the suggested stock-limitations are imposed. This measure would ensure the continuing poverty of many of the residents within the communal zone. Thirdly, if large numbers of cattle are the criteria for acquiring a commercial ranch, then the wealthy large cattle owners will have an advantage. Group ranches while theoretically viable, encounter a considerable amount of administrative problems. Also, if a "tribesman has the right to have as much land as he needs" then the larger cattle owners will need a great deal more land, immediately, especially in comparison with a non-stockholder (Appendix I, p. 95). Compounding these problems is the fact that large commercial type cattle posts already exist (in situ) in the commercial zones, owned by wealthy, usually absentee cattle owners. Thus, the policy protects the 'de facto' land rights of those who hold large customary allocations and grants them 'de jure' land rights through recognition by a lease.

5.4 Impact of the Policy

The attempt "to control the amount of tribal land occupied by any one owner was not an inherent part of the Tribal Grazing Land Policy" (Appendix I, p. 103). The size of a ranch is not limited nor is the number of ranches a person can lease (for fifty years). Also, there is presently no viable progressive taxation system on either income, land or cattle numbers in the agricultural sector to redistribute wealth (Egner and Klausen, 1980: 43). The policy statement that Land Boards will control the number and area of individual holdings is misleading as Land Boards have no political power and could not, even if desired, enforce the equitable distribution of land holding.

The only possible benefits in creating lease hold ranches under Tribal Grazing Land Policy are the protection of the rangeland within ranches, increased productivity within ranches and the money accruing to the government from land rent. Few significant benefits could take place in communal areas under the Tribal Grazing Land Policy contrary to what Temane implied when he said that the policy concentrated Government efforts on communal grazing land (Temane, 1980: 414). This theoretical contradiction leads to the necessity of monitoring the TGLP as it is implemented and evaluating its social and economic impact. The following chapter documents the implementation of the Tribal Grazing Land Policy in the Lepasha area of Central District and illustrates the impact of this on a small community.

CHAPTER 6

THE LEPASHA FIRST DEVELOPMENT AREA

6.1 Introduction

This chapter will analyse the implementation of the Tribal Grazing Land Policy in the Lepasha area of the Central District. This case study will provide other substantiation concerning the effects of the TGLP on rural residents and allow a forecast of the potential social impact nationally if the policy is widely implemented. The author is familiar with the area and the implementation procedures up to the signing of ranch leases by a number of applicants in 1981. Observations will be based on the author's personal knowledge of the area as well as social surveys carried out by the author and others during the course of their work (see Appendix II).

These surveys were generally carried out by qualified expatriates and their local counterparts and are felt to be reliable, although the information was not always gathered in a manner conducive to a thesis. The cadre of Remote Area Development Officers and District Officers (Land) were responsible for the majority of these surveys while some physical surveys were carried out by officers from the Ministry of Agriculture. This chapter will be divided into six sections: (1) the identification of a First Development Area (FDA), (2) the physical and historical background, (3) the characteristics of Lepasha, (4) implementation of TGLP in

Lepasha, (5) land access and social equality in Lepasha, and (6) the impact of TGLP on livestock production and the environment.

6.2 Identification of a First Development Area in Central District

Central government directives to implement the Tribal Grazing Land Policy were issued to Central District authorities in 1975. Remarkably, this was prior to the completion of the national consultation campaign (radio learning campaign) to inform citizens about and gain their reaction to the proposals contained within the policy. In effect the policy was approved by the Government without adequate public support. The Regional Agriculture Officer in Serowe first wrote the Land Use Planning Advisory Group that the "intention of the Central Government does include the provision for the immediate identification of TGLP First Development areas (FDA)" and requested implementation of the policy as quickly as possible (Willet, 1975: 1). In response, the senior district land use planner at the time stated that plans for development in the Central District "will not be steamrolled by the Ministry of Agriculture" (Huddleston, 1976: 1). Unfortunately, as events will prove, these statements as well as subsequent minutes of the Land Use Planning Advisory Group illustrate the continuous pressure which was being exerted by the Central Government for rapid implementation of the Tribal Grazing Land Policy.

Hesitance to implement rapidly the policy on the part of local authorities was largely due to the lack of comprehensive physical and

social data plus the absence of administrative resources to acquire the needed information in the near future (Greenhow, 1976: 2). However, Government directives could not be ignored, and planners were obliged to work within the constraint of limited information.

In December 1976, it was officially decided by the Ngwato Land Board that the Lepasha region would be the TGLP's First Development Area (FDA) in Central District (Ministry of Local Government and Lands, 1976: 1; Land Use Planning Advisory Group, October, 1976: 2). This area was chosen as a result of the personal knowledge of the area acquired in the Dukwe Township Survey, by the District Officer (Land) and, primarily, because local water source owners indicated their desire to acquire and develop ranches (Land Use Planning Advisory Group, 1976: 2). Interestingly, it could not be ascertained if this area was zoned Commercial prior to this decision or, if it were merely expedient for rapid policy implementation.

By January 1977 a Lepasha Area Commercial Ranch Development Plan proposal was drafted which noted that pressure at local and national levels dictated that implementation of the Tribal Grazing Land Policy must proceed, even though adequate information was not available (Greenhow, 1977: 1). "It is vitally important, therefore, that if and when development occurs in the Lepasha area, it must be closely monitored so that mistakes or repercussions which occur can be of use in later plans" (Ibid., 1977: 1). The Ngwato Land Board approved this plan which outlined the creation of twelve ranches in


two blocks separated by a communal area (Figure 6.1). This area is known as the Lepasha First Development Area (FDA). The communal zone of the FDA has no physical boundary (such as a fence) to separate it from communal land to the north or south. However, the use of the land is limited through distance from water sources. These tend to be located near the area called Lepasha Proper. Also, other people hold customary rights to the land outside the communal part of the FDA. Therefore, the area of land available to people living in the communal FDA zone is limited (Figure 6.1).

6.3 Physical and Historical Background

The Lepasha FDA is located in the northeast of Central District along the Lepasha River in the predominantly Bokalanga tribal region (Figure 1.1). The area is bounded by the Francistown-Dukwe road to the northeast, the Dukwe-Makoba veterinary (foot and mouth) cordon fence to the west and the Mosupe River to the southeast. Primary access to Lepasha Proper is by a dirt track just south of Mosetse village which is located on the Francistown-Dukwe paved road. The track is often impassable during the rains. The cordon fence maintenance road provides access to the relatively isolated ranches in the western region. The Lepasha FDA consists of two blocks of Commercially zoned areas totalling approximately 76,386 hectares, separated by the Communally zoned Lepasha Proper area of approximately 15,000 'accessible' hectares.

The soils are predominantly of the reddish ferruginous tropical

Figure 6,1 : Lepasha First Development Area



Source, Department of Town and Regional Planning, 1978, Gaborone

type with a sandy loam texture although localized patches of alkaline black clays and rocky ridges do occur (Field, 1977: 1). The sandy loam soils found in the Lepasha area are relatively well suited to crop cultivation and have been said to be better than many other areas in Botswana (Field, 1977: 2). However, the sorghum yield from the similar Tutume area was only 158 kilograms per hectare in 1980, below the national average (Ministry of Agriculture, 1980: 25). This may be a result of the 1980 drought conditions and the preference for local residents to grow millet. Nonetheless, there is considerable potential for expanding the area under cultivation in the Lepasha area (Field, 1977: 3).

At present, the Lepasha area is primarily woodland savanna dominated by Mopane trees (Colophospermum mopane) with a scattering of other Acacia species (Figure 2.1). The forage grasses in the Lepasha area are generally of poor to medium nutrient quality with low densities due to the Mopane forest canopy. However, the Mopane leaves do provide considerable fodder, for livestock in the dry season as well as for edible caterpillars. Field (1977: 2) has suggested a local carrying capacity of between 12 and 40 hectares per livestock unit, depending on the local vegetation and the amount of previous overgrazing, and an average regional carrying capacity (natural savanna) of 16 hectares per livestock unit (Figure 2.3). The latter figure will be used in this study as localized carrying capacity variations have not been systematically recorded.

The Lepasha River, which empties into the Makgadikgadi 'salt'

pans is not a 'sand river'. Therefore, it does not yield water from the river bed through the digging of shallow pits. However, hand dug shored wells on the edge of the river have been constructed and often yield dependable, year round water supplies. More recently, mechanically dug boreholes have been sunk throughout the region although the yield and saline content fluctuate. In general the area, although less densely populated, is typical of the northeastern hardveld where numerous settlements have been established and where a mixed system of livestock and crop production is successfully practiced.

Recent history establishes Lepasha Proper, the name this study uses for the nucleated settlement in the Communal area, as the first site settled in the 1920s (Wily, 1977: 1), although there were other previous land uses (Greenhow, 1977: 1), probably Basarwa. The first recorded permanent water source was a hand dug well constructed in 1928 by the father of the present headman Kgakgamatso Kebailele (Wily, 1977; 1). A cluster of water sources is now established in the vicinity. The capital intensive mechanically dug boreholes now found scattered throughout the area were established during the last 20 years.

Most cattle post owners, some from as far away as Gaborone 'brought in' Basarwa employees from their other cattle posts or recruited workers from nearby Moseitse Village. Traditionally, the workers, who primarily were herd boys, were paid, if at all, one 'beast' per annum, along with the right to milk cattle, some meat

from cattle which died a natural or accidental death, and some corn meal. The animal received in payment was often a male which made it impossible to build up a herd. Compounding this was the need to sell the animal to pay for articles such as clothes, pots, axes, tobacco, etc. More recently very low wages (average P9.68/month, Table 6.1) have been paid in place of the one beast per annum. The poor remuneration received by most employees, the limited number of cattlepost jobs in any case, and the lack of self-employed agricultural production opportunities, due primarily to a lack of assets, has maintained the need for many of these rural residents to supplement their incomes and basic subsistence needs. This has been accomplished through a diverse range of activities. Part time work as domestic servants, odd jobs, such as taking cattle to market, working on others' crops or, less commonly, on council road projects or even the mines in South Africa are all practised as part of the strategy to survive. Wild food is also gathered for home consumption and making alcoholic beverages (which are often sold). Firewood and thatching grass are similarly collected for personal use or, may again, be sold (Wily, 1977: 6). This practice of utilizing natural resources indicates that access to the land is still an important factor in meeting basic needs among rural residents. This applies alike to livestock owners and those who possess no livestock and are therefore unable to be directly involved in the agricultural sector.

6.4 Characteristics of the Lepasha Area

A number of social surveys were carried out in the Lepasha region between 1975 and 1980 (summarized in Appendix II). These surveys were often called 'Population Surveys' because they tended to focus on locating areas of settlement, establishing the population and the basic socio-economic characteristics. Unfortunately, these surveys tended to focus on the area zoned Commercial, where the actual land tenure change would occur, rather than on the Communal section of the First Development Area.

The surveys typically used the water source location as the focus for locating population. This was fairly effective in the Lepasha area as the water sources, and therefore settlements, were well spaced - with the exception of Lepasha Proper. Interviewers would drive to adjacent water sources under the direction of local residents, locate the water source position on a base map and proceed to identify themselves and their mission to the people there. Interviewers would establish who owned the water source and then interview the head of each 'compound' dependent on that water source. A compound is generally composed of a rondavel (hut) or, more often, a group of rondavels, usually surrounded by a stockade of mud or wood walls. The compound typically consists of a nuclear family and some extended family relations. However, sometimes a number of families lived in a compound or even a group of single employees. Data acquired usually consisted of ethnic origin, length of stay, numbers employed within the compound, wages, livestock ownership, cultivation

practices, gathering activities, etc. (see Appendix II). The results of these surveys are not totally accurate. However, it is felt that they are fairly reliable, and more importantly, when generalized, give a good picture of the basic social-economic characteristics of the people in the Lepasha FDA prior to implementation of the Tribal Grazing Land Policy.

The survey results show the total population of the FDA at 441 persons in an area of 91,386 hectares (Table 6.1). Basarwa were found to be the largest ethnic group comprising 68 per cent of the population (Table 6.1). The population density variations between the Communal and Commercial area were significant with one person per 70 hectares in the Communal zones versus one person per 378 hectares in the Commercial zone (Table 6.1). Thus, treating the land base as homogeneous, the potential difference in population density and agricultural potential per person is evident in the event that the Commercial area is restricted to residents presently occupying this zone. However, as will be seen, the potential disparity in population density and productivity is vastly underestimated if cattle and water source ownership statistics are analysed.

The stocking rates in the Lepasha FDA are slightly below the maximum carrying capacity of 16 hectares per livestock (unit) in both the Communal and Commercial zone. Despite this overgrazing is evident around all water sources, especially in the vicinity of Lepasha Proper. The present stocking rate and the distribution within ranches indicates that only very limited numbers of cattle

Table 6.1 : Generalized Lepasha FDA Results

Ranch ID Number	Water Source Owners	Ranch Area	Cattle Population	Heifers/Lowstock	Water Source	Resident Pastors	Other Residents	Total Population	Heifers Person	Barrows Employees	Other Cattle Owners	Ave Cash Price	Other Employees
OP-3	R.T. Nakapi (absentee)	6,972	500	14	2 BH	22	0	22	315	4	0	P19 00	0
OP-6	M. Nkomo (seasonal)	6,236	62	100	1 W	3	5	8	779	3	0	P5 33	0
OP-7	G.T. Mogale (absentee)	6,404	190	33	1 BH	6	1	7	914	5	4	P6 20	1
OP-4	O.J. Chilume M.P. (absentee)	6,274	420	15	1 BH	16	1	17	369	2	221	P4 00	1
OP-8	Chinamanama Syn (B. owners)	7,336	1000+	7	2 BH 1 W	>52	>8	60	122	9	0	P8 50	N.A.
OP-9	J.G. Mathangwane (resident)	6,928	291	24	1 BH	10	6	16	433	3	0	P11 66	0
OP-5	T. Mokgethi (absentee)	6,392	500	13	1 BH	21	5	26	246	6	0	P5 00	0
OP-10	M. Maswikiti M.P. (absentee)	6,392	220	29	1 BH	1	8	9	710	1	10	P12 00	1
OP-11	T. Maposa & Kenosi (seasonal)	5,548	200	28	2 BH	14	2	16	347	7	0	P8 00	0
OP-12	R. Manisa (absentee)	5,968	180	33	2 BH	10	0	10	597	2	0	P8 00	0
OP-14	D. Moshabe & Mupumiso (absentee)	5,468	400	14	2 BH	16	11	27	202	5	2	P6 50	2
OP-13	T. Chengeta (absentee)	6,468	400	16	2 BH	4	4	8	808	4	0	P22 00	4
Total COMMERCIAL Area	21 Water Source Owners	76,386	4,363	17.5 A/Re 27 A/R	19	175	51	226	378 A/Re 486 A/R	51	237	P 9 68	9
Total COMMUNAL Area	9 Water Source Owners	15,000	≥ 700	21.4	10	175	40	215	70	≤ 22	53	N.A.	N.A.

SOURCE : Appendix Two

A/R=Average/Ranch
A/Re=Average/Region
BH=Borehole
W=Well

could be added to those presently within the Commercial ranches or Communal FDA without causing regional overgrazing (Table 6.1). Therefore, the case study suggests that the TGLP promise that cattle from Communal areas will move to Commercial areas, reducing overgrazing, is a false one (Appendix I, p. 108). Thus, reduction in overgrazing in this area through cattle movement, one objective of the Tribal Grazing Land Policy, cannot be realized.

As discussed earlier, the ownership of cattle and water sources is a valid indicator of socio-economic position. In the FDA there are a total of 29 water sources owned by 30 individuals (Table 6.1). The 21 water source owners in the commercial zone own 4,126 cattle or over 94 per cent of the livestock in this zone (summarized from Appendix II). Similarly, the 9 water source owners in the Communal area own approximately 674 cattle or about 96 per cent of the cattle (ibid). This indicates a high degree of correlation between water source ownership and cattle ownership in Lepasha. The ownership figures on residents of Basarwa origin bear this out. The Basarwa own 7 per cent of the water sources (two wells which are located in the Communal zone) and 3 per cent of the livestock (ibid). Considering that residents of Basarwa origin comprise 68 per cent of the population, the inequitable distribution of these factors is apparent, especially in a region where agriculture is the primary economic activity. These figures also suggest that disparities in cattle ownership in the large cattle post commercially zoned areas may be above the national average (Figure 3.2) and related to ethnic

origin. As a group Basarwa possess few livestock and own few water sources.

Survey results (Table 6.1) also indicated that a large percentage of water source owners had permanent residences and employment in distant towns and villages. In the Commercial zone over 75 percent were found to be 'absentee' from their cattle posts for extended periods. These absentee owners include several Members of Parliament, a college principal, a senior veterinary officer at one end of the scale, and a few traditional farmers at the other end. Many of these water source owners could in fact be considered part of the elite within Botswana.

6.5 Implementation of TGLP in Lepasha

In May 1977 the Ngwato Land Board held its first official local meeting in Lepasha, a considerable time after the official FDA plan approval. During this and subsequent meetings local residents had the opportunity to express their opinion concerning the development of private leasehold ranches in their community (see Appendix II for a list of speakers). The opinions expressed tended to be divided into two basic camps based primarily on cattle and water source ownership.

One group consisted of the ranch applicants and water source owners who already held 'de facto' land rights in the area (based on water source ownership). The new TGLP policy which would give them 'de jure' leasehold rights was favourably received although some

minor complaints arose. The ranch applicants typically complained about the small size of the ranches (approximately 6,400 hectares carrying over 400 head), the irregular shape of ranches in respect to their established water source(s) and the capital cost of physical ranch development (i.e., fencing). The size of the ranches was initially recommended by the Ministry of Agriculture and compatible with the Land Board regulation of spacing newly allocated water source rights (boreholes) eight kilometers apart. They also expressed the desire for total secure control over the land and resources within the boundaries of their ranch. In other words, they wanted secure title to as much land as they could get.

A few water source owners within the commercial FDA did not wish to develop leasehold ranches because of individual circumstances, examples being a lack of cattle to meet capital costs (Ranch OP-6, Figure 6.1) or the inability of a number of water source owners to legally syndicate (Ranch OP-8, Figure 6.1). Other cattlepost owners on the periphery of the FDA questioned the loss of grazing land to the enclosed commercial ranches.

The Ngwato Land Board passed over the rather blatant questions pertaining to ranch size and informed ranch applicants that the additional development of centrally located water sources was allowed and even encouraged. Government support on capital expenditures was hinted at as well as the availability of easily secured low interest loans from the National Development Bank. The Ngwato Land Board assured all water source owners that they would not be forced to move.

or take a lease and suggested that water source owners peripheral to the FDA would also have the opportunity to develop a commercial ranch in the future. The latter were also informed that ranches were meant to be at least 4 kilometers from any other water source, their recognised 'de facto' customary grazing land allocation and, therefore, they really have no claim over grazing land within the new commercial ranches. Cattle owners without a water source were essentially ignored. The Land Boards rationale for this was the fact that any water source owner could refuse to allow others to use their water, regardless of 'de facto' or 'de jure' land ownership. A water source is privately owned despite land tenure, and can be used as a tool to ensure the land use desired by the owner. The Ngwato Land Board responses further substantiate the suggestion that the ownership of a water source will be the critical factor when determining who has access, control and eventually, ownership of land.

In contrast, the larger group composed of non-water source owners with few or no cattle was generally less vocal at official meetings. Possibly these people, many cattle post employees, were apprehensive about the reaction of their employers if they voiced dissent. Also, this group, often illiterate, was probably not fully aware of the implications of the proposed land tenure change. However, questions pertaining to a theme of 'where will we go' were recurrently voiced, indicating some awareness of the spatial limitations of the accessible communal area. One non-livestock

holder, Mr. Kgonelo Manee stated that he was dependent on the collection of wild foods, thatching grass and firewood for his livelihood and was, therefore, in opposition to fenced ranches which would limit his access to natural resources (Ngwato Land Board, 1977: 4). "Mr. Kgagisang who spoke in Sesarwa stated that (the) Land Board was filling up the land with fences (and asked) that they...be shown where they will be making their living" (Ngwato Land Board, 1977: 5). A Mr. Lachenesi stated that "the Land Board had made their questions too technical purposely to stifle further question(s), (an) example being whether those people who live by collecting fruits were to be allowed to fence" (Ibid., 1977: 5). "He further said that he does not agree with fencing at all and that no one would allow people to cut grass from his farm (putting himself in the place of an owner) with the risk that they would set the farm on fire" (Ibid., 1977: 5). Other evidence is also available on the feeling of Basarwa in Lepasha. Wily reports that one Basarwa stated "that they were really worried that they have no fields and, even if they had fields, they have no oxen to plough (Wily, 1977: 3). These opinions, although poorly expressed, are thought to be shared by many of the 'poorer' residents in Lepasha. The issues not directly addressed included the potential impact of the policy on total employment, the conditions of employment and future access to livestock for transportation, draught power and milk.

Official responses to queries from non-stock owners were generally vague and rather evasive, partially because many local

officials were unfamiliar with the policy and due to the general nature of the policy itself. A typical response can be found in a report by the Ngwato Land Board, which states "that the 'small men' are equal in the face of the Government and usually the Government is concerned about the small men" (Ngwato Land Board, 1977: 5). No serious consideration, let alone commitment was given to the potential plight of the non-stock holders. Basarwa were simply assured by the Land Board that they would be listened to and looked after. Basarwa were almost righteously informed that they should not object to the establishment of ranches as this activity is 'development' and to their benefit. Unfortunately, words do not always reflect the actions of a man or a government. The Ngwato Land Board, under pressure from Central Government Ministries and the District Council, granted leases to most of the ranches in 1980.

6.6 Land Access and Social Equality in Lepasha

Implementation of the Tribal Grazing Land Policy in Lepasha has meant the granting of leases to water source owners within the Commercial zone to develop ranches. The attempt by local authorities to add 'appendices' to the TGLP lease "designed to protect residents or to impose stock limitations...has been ruled illegal by the Attorney General's Chambers" (Ministry of Agriculture, 1982: 2). Thus, a few water source owners have gained 'absolute' control over the land under common law. Commercial zone employees and communal area residents are not able to 'trespass' on ranches for the

collection resources without the owner's permission. In effect those water source owners who have taken leases in the commercial zone have been able to gain 'de jure' control over 76,386 hectares leaving the area's present ranch workers, who previously enjoyed customary land rights, as hired help and squatters. Probably those who are not employed will eventually be forced to move to the Communal area.

Even without this reverse migration the economic differential between ranch owners and communal residents is apparent and will increase. In effect, the 215 Communal residents will continue to enjoy recognized customary access to 15,000 hectares, shared equally, 70 hectares per person (Table 6.1). In comparison the potential 21 commercial ranchers, with 76,386 legally recognized hectares, shared equally, would possess 3,637 hectares per person (ibid). In fact omitting ranch OP-8 whose potential owners are unwilling to acquire a lease at present, ranch owners would possess on average 5,875 hectares per person. This is approaching the nominal size (6,400 hectares) of one TGLP ranch per water source owner. However, as mentioned, there is no regulation limiting the number of other cattle posts or ranches owned. Concentration of land ownership in a few hands is very likely to be the result.

Further, the rent set on the land is at the sub-economic level of 4 thebe (approximately 5 cents U.S.) per hectare or P256.000 per year for a 6,400 hectare ranch (Ministry of Agriculture, 1982: 2). Thus, the government raises little money (especially if development expenditures and opportunity costs are taken into consideration)

which could be re-invested into the community. There has been no direct compensation to communal residents for their loss of customary land rights. The development of a 'Communal Service Centre' has been the only project undertaken as a result of implementation of the Tribal Grazing Land Policy in the Lepasha communal area. This project, sometimes considered compensation, cost P43,659, and provided a small school, health post and a community water source (Ministry of Local Government and Lands, 1981: 23). However, population figures warranted these infrastructural developments from the Council's general development budget, quite independent of the implementation of the TGLP.

These arguments lead to the conclusion that the implementation of the TGLP in Lepasha will compound the initial disparities in cattle, water source ownership and land. This will probably reduce potential economic opportunities in gathering natural resources and in the agricultural sector, lead to continued unemployment and poverty. For instance, the need for herd boys will probably be reduced on fenced commercial ranches. Crop production, which is dependent on draught power, will not be possible for a large percentage of the population due to inequitable livestock distribution and, eventually, land distribution. Therefore, employment opportunities will be lost. Also, the majority of Botswana's grain crops are produced by families who own few or modest numbers of livestock, while large cattle owners contribute little to arable agriculture in comparison to the number of livestock they

hold. This suggests that the potential crop production in this suitable area may not be developed. Thus, in the Lepasha First Development Area the Tribal Grazing Land Policy will not achieve its goal of promoting greater social equality and it will reduce the potential for crop production.

6.6 Impact of TGLP on Livestock Production and the Environment

What has been the impact of the TGLP on livestock production and overgrazing? Unfortunately, the ranches in Lepasha have only been recently established and cannot provide much information regarding changes in overgrazing or livestock production. In fact, little information is available on livestock production or on the extent of environmental degradation prior to the development of ranches. It is also probable that ranchers in the Lepasha First Development Area are not maintaining records on changes in livestock production or input costs. Therefore, monitoring the physical and economic benefits (to ranchers) of the Tribal Grazing Land Policy in Lepasha will be difficult, if not impossible. However, the question must be addressed, even if indirectly.

Other sources of information are available concerning the environmental impact of private commercial ranching - Kenya's Swynnerton Plan which resulted in private ownership of grazing areas has, in general, "yielded neither the economic nor the ecological benefits intended" (Ministry of Agriculture, 1981: 4). In Botswana, there are also examples of drastically overgrazed freehold and

leasehold ranches (Ibid., p. 7). In some cases the TGLP commercial ranches are becoming so badly overgrazed that "ranchers have moved their herds back to the communal area" (Ministry of Agriculture, 1982: 12).

The reason for the continued overgrazing in privately held ranches is a function of both social and economic circumstances. Historically, "large scale cattle ownership has been both a means of displaying political and social success, and of further solidifying it by the loan of animals to followers with the expectation of reciprocated support in public affairs...Since no competing forms of value have yet emerged in Botswana, these traditional values persist...continued cattle acquisition, without any envisaged ceiling, is seen as rational and desirable" (Dekure, S., Dyson-Hudson, N., 1981, in World Bank, 1982: 5). Although the cattle on commercial ranches are no longer loaned, the desire for large herds has not decreased. The numbers of cattle held are often as important as the economic returns.

When the policy was introduced potential ranchers were informed that they could increase the stocking rate on simply managed commercial ranches and increase both their numbers and profits. "There is now no basis in experience for this belief" (Ministry of Agriculture, 1981: 11). For instance, in an area of Namibia bordering Botswana it was found that one fenced farm of 6,000 hectares needed eighteen paddocks for efficient livestock management, and that decisions on livestock movements within these paddocks,

marketing schedules, deticking, maintenance, etcetera. were done by a responsible resident manager and not according to a prepared schedule (Ibid., p. 11). Environmental and economic factors fluctuate too widely to allow such a schedule. Therefore, absenteeism, as in the case of Lepasha's ranchers, is a constraint to the effective use of improved ranch management techniques as well as the low number of paddocks which will probably be constructed. In many cases experience has shown that, only perimeter fencing may be erected. This indicates that increased production per unit of land, as a function of improved range management would be unlikely in these ranches. Thus, any increase in stocking rates above those recommended for similar communal areas may result in overgrazing. This suggests that the TGLP objective of increasing ranch production is unlikely on 'absentee owned' ranches without causing environmental degradation.

Even if adequate management is provided, however, the cost of establishing commercial ranches may be excessive, given the present cost of the largely imported materials. In the western statelands of Botswana 24 'Breeding Ranches' had been established under the First Livestock Development Project by 1980 (World Bank, 1982: 26). These ranches of 6,500 hectares were fully developed by the government and then leased to cattlemen from neighbouring villages, in a manner similar to the method used under the Tribal Grazing Land Policy. The yield was anticipated to be 90-100 animals per ranch per year, compared with 21 animals per year per tenant prior to development

(World Bank, 1982: 42). The physical development costs of these ranches came to P28,370.00 although costs could have been reduced by nearly 35% through the use of local materials for fence posts and droppers (Ibid., 28, 40). In comparison, a traditional cattle post in Lepasha could be established for under P12,000.00. Thus, increased production on commercial ranches would be necessary to meet the increased development costs. However, monitoring herd performance in the Nojane village communal area and Nojane ranches in Botswana gave calving percentages at 33 per cent on the communal area versus 23 per cent on the commercial ranches! (Ibid., p. 41). Although our World Bank observers urge caution when using these statistics, there is no doubt that the government's assumed production increase are false. The actual low calving rates on commercial ranches are a result of overstocking, and relatedly, overgrazing. The reason for this paradox is that "if the ranchers kept their cattle numbers down to near the stock carrying capacity of their land they could not repay their loans for ranch development (World Bank, 1982: 41). Thus, development and maintenance costs have contributed to overstocking and environmental deterioration. Therefore, experience suggests that fully developed commercial ranches may also be economically and environmentally undesirable at this time in Botswana.

In summary, this chapter has used the Lepasha First Development Area as an example of the potential impact of the Tribal Grazing Land Policy on the distribution of 'wealth' within the area. Land has

increasingly become the property of the elite who already own a large percentage of the nation's cattle and water resources. As a result production opportunities will probably be lost in the arable agriculture sector, as will employment opportunities. Overgrazing in the communal areas will not be reduced, and may increase. In fact, it is suggested that neither increased livestock production nor decreased environmental degradation on the ranches themselves will be achieved.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSIONS

The evaluation of the Tribal Grazing Land Policy 'land reform' being implemented in the Lepasha area of Central District, Botswana has suggested that the policy objectives "to stop overgrazing and degradation of the veld, to promote greater equality of income in the rural areas and to allow growth and commercialization of the livestock industry on a sustained basis" (Appendix I, p. 92) will not be realized. It has been shown that social inequalities in the redistribution of wealth will be intensified through loss of access to land. In addition, it is also probable that livestock production will not be increased nor overgrazing reduced. Crop production potential may even be decreased as a result of reduced access to draught power and the removal of good cropland (dependent of soil capability) from use by communal residents. The only benefits, which accrue to a few wealthy individuals, seem to be the legal recognition of individual control over relatively large areas of grazing land. In essence, this preserves the 'status quo' of highly unequal livestock distribution, reduces livestock ownership opportunities among the remaining communal residents, and eliminates the traditional use of natural resources (gathering) in commercially developed areas and adjacent communal areas.

This leads to the immediate recommendation that the Lepasha area, and the Tribal Grazing Land Policy in general, be much more


closely monitored in the future to establish the detailed socioeconomic impact on the community and the agricultural sector. Production figures and environmental data should be collected systematically to support a comprehensive analysis of the policy and outline potential improvements or alternative development policies.

A desegregation of demographic data into age, sex and their relationship to various economic activities could also benefit future analysis and policy formulation. A further study could also examine the political aspects of the 'new man' versus the traditional man and the implications to the distribution of development benefits (Kuper, 1970: 54). An examination of the political process would enable a better understanding of the role of the 'elite' in public policy formulation.

On a national level, the Tribal Grazing Land Policy appears to reflect the culmination of a number of historical processes which have led to the establishment of a ruling elite within the country. The traditional mode of production has been drastically modified through the introduction of the capitalist monetary system. As a result of this, the ruling elite have, to a large extent, become independent and isolated from the majority of the population. General development efforts have tended to focus on urban oriented physical infrastructure rather than promoting increased production and creating employment opportunities. This has led to an economy increasingly dependent on a few exports and substantial imports, including foodstuffs, primarily from the Republic of South Africa.

22

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The Tribal Grazing Land Policy does nothing to remedy these problems. This study has substantiated Picard's claim that "Those who have the most to benefit from the new scheme (TGLP) will be those politicians and bureaucrats who both formulated the policy...and who will be readily able to take economic advantage of the land tenure change" (Picard, 1977: 40).

It is suggested that the problem of social inequalities can only be solved if a government and society are committed to their reduction. Thus, in a country dominated by a strong elite it would be necessary to gain the real commitment of this group before the reduction of these inequalities can occur. This would be a prerequisite to the success of development efforts and probably the most important factor in the success of any development strategy, including either the 'centre down' or 'from below' strategy. In Botswana, the promotion of greater equality of income in rural areas can only be achieved through the redistribution of cattle and guaranteeing secure access to land, as well as promoting small scale regionally distributed industrial activities. This would reduce unemployment and probably increase grain crop production. The difficulty is explaining to an elite why they should redistribute what they consider their justly earned wealth.

The problem of overgrazing is more difficult to deal with. Some form of stock limitation seems unavoidable if desertification is to be avoided. Objections to a stock limitation based on carrying capacity could be moderated, at least among benefiting recipients, if

livestock redistribution was carried out concurrently. Progressive taxation, fines, new pricing policies, registering and branding livestock could all be used as tools in a holistic programme to pressure the redistribution of wealth and the reduction of overgrazing. If the challenge of a real land reform is not met it is probable that Botswana will be increasingly dependent on imports, higher unemployment rates will occur, and rural-urban migration will continue. As poverty grows, so will social and political unrest. The decision is largely up to the socio-economic elite; are their short term rewards worth the longer term uncertainties?

APPENDIX I

National Policy on Tribal Grazing Land



REPUBLIC OF BOTSWANA

89

GOVERNMENT PAPER NO. 2 OF 1975

**NATIONAL POLICY ON TRIBAL
GRAZING LAND**

JULY, 1975

GABORONE, REPUBLIC OF BOTSWANA

INDEX

90

		<u>Paragraph(s)</u>	<u>Page(s)</u>
<u>PART I:</u>	<u>INTRODUCTION</u>		
	General	1 - 4	1
	Background	5 - 7	1 - 2
<u>PART II:</u>	<u>THE PRESENT SYSTEM AND WHY IT SHOULD BE CHANGED</u>		
	Present Opportunities	8 - 9	3
	Range Deterioration	10	2
	Wealth and Poverty	11 - 15	3 - 4
<u>PART III:</u>	<u>THE ALTERNATIVE - IMPROVED GRAZING AND LIVESTOCK MANAGEMENT, MUCH MORE MONEY BETTER DISTRIBUTED TO MORE PEOPLE</u>	16 - 19	5
	<u>THE PROPOSALS</u>		
<u>PART IV:</u>	<u>HOW THE ALTERNATIVE CAN BE ACHIEVED - BY A NEW SYSTEM OF LAND ALLOCATION</u>		
	Objectives	20 - 21	6
	Commercial Farming Areas	22 - 24	6
	Communal Grazing Areas	25 - 26	6 - 7
	Reserved Areas	27	7
	Better Income Distribution	28 - 32	7 - 8
	Summary	33	8
	Figure I: National Policy for Tribal Grazing Land		9
<u>PART V:</u>	<u>THE RULES FOR ZONING, ALLOCATION, AND LEASES</u>		
	Responsibilities	34 - 35	10
	How Tribal Land Will Be Zoned	36 - 39	10 - 11
	How People Will Use The Communal Areas	40	11 - 12
	How Land Will Be Allocated In Commercial Areas	41 - 42	12 - 14
	Terms Of Leases	43 - 45	14 - 15
	How The Rules Will Be Applied In Different Areas	46	15

	<u>Paragraph(s)</u>	<u>Page(s)</u>
<u>PART VI:</u> <u>STAGES AND TIMING OF</u> <u>IMPLEMENTATION</u>	47 - 53	16 - 17
<u>PART VII:</u> <u>PUBLIC CONSULTATION ABOUT THE</u> <u>NATIONAL POLICY ON TRIBAL</u> <u>GRAZING LAND</u>	54 - 58	18

General

1. 'The time has come to tackle a subject about which there has been a lot of talk but not much action - the better use and development of our land. As our human population and the numbers of our cattle and other livestock increase there is a growing danger that grazing will be destroyed by uncontrolled use of communal grazing areas by ever growing numbers of animals. Once grazing has been destroyed it is extremely difficult to get grass re-established. And under our communal grazing system it is in no one individual's interest to limit the number of his animals. If one man takes his cattle off, someone else moves his own cattle in. Unless livestock numbers are somehow tied to specific grazing areas no one has an incentive to control grazing.... We are faced with a situation which demands action.' (Address by the President, Sir Seretse Khama, to the fourteenth Annual Conference of the Botswana Democratic Party at Mahalapye, 28 March 1975.)
2. Proposals are made here for implementing Government policy on grazing land development. This means changing the traditional system of land tenure in the tribal grazing areas. It will change the Botswana way of life; it will affect directly or indirectly, virtually every Motswana.
3. It is vital that the need for change and the reasoning behind the Government's proposals are fully understood.
4. It is proposed to change only present practices regarding use of grazing land; not the way arable lands are allocated or used.

Background

5. The Government's policy on tribal land development was set forth in Government Paper No. 2 of 1973, National Policy for Rural Development. It is further explained in the National Development Plan 1973-78. The main issues were set out in Government Paper No. 1 of 1972, Rural Development in Botswana and by the consultants R Chambers and D Feldman in their Report on Rural Development (1972). The aims are to stop over-grazing and degradation of the veld; to promote greater equality of incomes in the rural areas; and to allow growth and commercialisation of the livestock industry on a sustained basis.
6. Not much has been done until recently about making the policy a reality. While what should be done was clear, it was hard to decide how it should be done. Mistakes made at the beginning could be hard to correct later on. In particular, there is a need from the start to protect the smaller stockowners and those

who own no cattle. They must be given a chance along with the large owners to benefit from development of the cattle industry.

7. The Government now intends to bring in the new policy for grazing land. There are people who fear what can happen if the old ways of land holding and land use are changed. For example, some fear that the small owners will be forced to move and the rich will come to control all the land. The Government recognizes that these fears exist but is convinced that through careful planning and consultation with the people the dangers can be avoided. Planning will aim to ensure that land development helps the poor and does not make them worse off.

PART II : THE PRESENT SYSTEM AND WHY IT SHOULD BE CHANGEDPresent Opportunities

8. The Ministry of Agriculture has developed an improved system of range management. Although it is simple to use it allows us to raise many more cattle on the same amount of land. At the same time favourable beef prices offer tempting profits and higher incomes than ever before.
9. There has been a dramatic response to the favourable beef prices. The cattle population has risen rapidly to nearly two-and-a-half million head, and the BMC has slaughtered and marketed an unprecedented number of animals. Unfortunately, these increases have had two bad effects under the present system.

Range deterioration

10. Increased herds, under the system of uncontrolled grazing, have led to serious overgrazing around villages, surface water sources and boreholes. Overgrazing has led to sheet erosion and bush encroachment which reduces the amount of good grazing. This is worst for the small cattle owners, most of whose herds graze in the village areas.

Wealth and Poverty

11. As a result of the pressure on village grazing areas, richer people are drilling more and more boreholes for cattle posts in sandveld areas which used to be empty. Borehole rights have been granted to any tribesman who can obtain finance. The only control is the rule calling for five miles between boreholes. Under the present system, the wealthier cattle owners secure virtually exclusive rights to the land around their boreholes. More and more grazing land gets taken up by a few large cattle owners. Meanwhile those who own only a few livestock stay where they are in the village areas with little hope of improvement. As the numbers of people and their cattle increase year by year, good grazing becomes scarcer. It therefore becomes more important to ensure that the available grazing is properly used and equitably distributed.
12. Improved systems of management and allocation of land will deal with these problems. One of the bad effects of the present system is that no one, rich or poor, can reap the benefits of improved management. In the communal grazing areas, only basic veterinary care is possible. Even the larger owners with remote cattle posts can do little without fencing. The result is low returns for all.

13. We must alter the old system. If we go on as we are doing now, not only will production and profit per hectare go down every year, but the gap between rich and poor will grow bigger. If we can remove the limitations of the communal grazing system, everyone will benefit.
14. This does not mean that a completely different system should be introduced. There are good aspects of the traditional system which must be preserved. Most important is the right of every tribesman to have as much land as he needs to sustain himself and his family. The grazing land policy will protect this right.
15. The policy will also protect the rights of those who have been granted allocations under the old system. These have been made according to the terms of the Tribal Land Act, as will allocations under the new system.

PART III : THE ALTERNATIVE - IMPROVED GRAZING AND
LIVESTOCK MANAGEMENT, MUCH MORE MONEY,
BETTER DISTRIBUTED TO MORE PEOPLE

16. The aim of the Government's grazing land policy, and the proposals outlined in Parts IV and V below is clear. It is to provide cattle owners, large and small, with ways of increasing their farming incomes. To achieve this, better range management is essential.
17. The output and profit from cattle can be more than doubled by using very simple methods of management (rotational grazing, controlled breeding, early weaning, daily watering, bonemeal feeding). Correct stocking rates, and paddocking to permit some rotational grazing, will halt deterioration, allow the grass to improve, and provide standing hay for the dry season. All that is needed is some fencing and some piping of water. Land can carry more cattle if it is fenced and watered than if it is open. Properly run group and individual ranches can carry twice as many head as under uncontrolled grazing. The improved system also provides more incentive and makes it easier to build fire breaks and control veld fires.
18. Improved management, especially fencing, allows land to be used to the full, with the best returns to the farmer. But farmers who have or can get money to invest must have an incentive. Under the traditional system there is no incentive - it is in no one person's interest to conserve the grazing in a particular area. It is a free for all. Stockowners should be given complete control over the areas where their animals graze. They will then have an interest in looking after that grazing.
19. The next section describes how the present land allocation system can be changed so that improved management is possible.

Objectives

20. The basic objectives of changing the present system are:
- a) To make grazing control, better range management and increased productivity possible. The improved management system must start with fenced areas and land over which exclusive rights are recognized. Therefore under certain conditions, groups and individuals must be granted exclusive rights to land.
 - b) To safeguard the interests of those who own only a few cattle or none at all.
21. To meet both these aims, Government will encourage Land Boards to divide the tribal grazing areas into three zones - Commercial Farming Areas, Communal Grazing Areas, and Reserved Areas. The terms of tenure and the type of development permitted will be different for each zone.

Commercial Farming Areas

22. In these areas, groups and individuals will be given exclusive rights to specific areas of grazing land. A defined number of hectares of land will be allocated, not simply the use of a borehole as is now the case. Ranch development will be encouraged, including fencing and piping of water.
23. Leases will be granted in Commercial Farming Areas, and land in these areas will cease to be held in the traditional way. Rents will be payable to the local authorities in return for the exclusive rights given in the lease.
24. Proposed rules for allocation and development in Commercial Farming Areas are set out in Part V. These areas are not meant only for the large individual cattle owners. First priority will be to help groups of smaller owners to run commercial ranches. Preference will be given to such groups in making allocations.

Communal Grazing Areas

25. In these areas the traditional communal grazing system will not be changed and no rent will be paid. These will be mainly the present communal grazing areas near villages.

26. Although tenure in the communal areas will not be changed, we must find ways to teach people better management and how to solve the problem of overgrazing. Until stocking rates are brought into line with the carrying capacity of the land in all communal areas, it will be impossible for farmers in those areas to make any real progress.

Reserved Areas

27. These areas will be set aside for the future. They are safeguards for the poorer members of the population. Suitably large areas of grazing will be reserved and guaranteed for future use by those who have only a few cattle at present. In addition to reserved grazing areas, land may be reserved for alternative uses such as wildlife, mining and cultivation.

Better Income Distribution


28. Closing the gap between rich and poor depends on the smaller owners having the opportunity, the knowledge and skills to increase their herds. The opportunity will be provided by the rules which will be laid down for allocation and land use. The Ministry of Agriculture's extension services will supply the knowledge and skills. It is also essential that Land Boards should bear the interests of the poorer people constantly in mind, especially when considering how much land should be reserved for future use, when working out ways to help groups of smaller stockowners and in collecting rents to use in developing the communal areas.
29. It is urgent to tackle the problem of overgrazing in the village areas. Stocking rates will be brought into line with the carrying capacity of the land by:
- a) encouraging the larger owners to remove their herds and start commercial ranches, and
 - b) by land boards controlling the amount of stock which may be kept in the communal areas. Mafisa cattle will be counted as belonging to the holder. When the larger herds have gone, small owners will have more opportunity to improve management and increase production.
30. The use of existing and new private dams, wells and boreholes for watering livestock in communal areas will be restricted. Individuals will not be allowed to have private water sources for watering more animals than the maximum laid down by the Land Board. Persons wishing to have a private water source for

watering more animals than the maximum set by the Land Board will be required to seek a commercial allocation. The only exception is that groups or co-operative ranches will be permitted in communal areas whenever there is full agreement within the community. These groups will be encouraged to fence and develop water supplies for their ranches.


31. Private boreholes used for domestic or arable agriculture purposes will be permitted.
32. The Ministry of Agriculture is working out how best to form groups of small cattle owners. Pilot projects will be set up in different parts of Botswana. People will be told how to copy the successful systems.
33. Figure I provides a summary of the new system of land allocation.

FIGURE 1 : NATIONAL POLICY FOR TRIBAL GRAZING LAND

WHAT IS HAPPENING NOW



WHAT WILL HAPPEN INSTEAD



* To be determined for the various Land Boards areas by the individual Land Board in consultation with the Ministries of Agriculture and Local Government

PART V: THE RULES FOR ZONING, ALLOCATION AND LEASESResponsibilities

34. Carrying out the policy will be the task of the Tribal Land Boards. This section shows how Land Boards will:
- a) Zone land
 - b) Allocate land within each zone.
 - c) Grant leases.
35. Government will guide the Land Boards in the execution of this policy. It will give advice and then allow each Land Board to decide how to implement the policy in the light of conditions existing in its area. Each Land Board area has different characteristics and zoning and allocation policies will differ accordingly.

How Tribal Land will be Zoned

36. Zoning will be the first step. The objectives of zoning are:
- a) To manage the land in the best interest of the people and their descendants.
 - b) To provide security for subsistence farmers with respect to arable land, grazing of draft animals, milk production, and smallstock, now and in future.
 - c) To preserve village grazing areas now under communal use.
 - d) To induce people to move cattle out of overstocked areas.
 - e) To encourage fencing and improved management on existing cattle posts in order to improve offtake and carrying capacity.
 - f) To reserve areas for national purposes, including wildlife, mining etc.
 - g) To reserve areas for future ranching and/or communal use.

37. To achieve these objectives the following RULES will apply:
- a) Existing areas of communal use will be kept communal.
 - b) Areas where people already have control of blocks of land, such as sandveld cattleposts, will be classified commercial, unless there is a special reason for including them in communal zones.
 - c) If communal areas are already overcrowded, they will be made bigger.
38. A series of practical steps needs to be taken. We must have the facts about the present situation, before deciding how big the commercial areas can be. The steps will be:
- a) Map the actual boundaries of existing grazing and lands areas.
 - b) Map all existing and potential water sources and collect other survey data.
 - c) Decide which areas are best for different purposes.
 - d) Assess potential demands for different categories of land over the next fifty years.
 - e) Decide how much land is left for commercial development after taking into account communal, reserved and national needs.
39. An interim policy is needed for allocating grazing. In special cases commercial areas will be allocated in 1975 and 1976, even before public consultation has been completed, and while the main programme is getting under way. This is necessary to avoid bringing new investment in the livestock industry to a halt during the planning period.

How People Will Use the Communal Areas

40. Under the new system the following RULES will apply in the communal areas:
- a) Each Land Board will say how many livestock units may be kept by one person, family or group on various communal land areas. Those who exceed the maximum allowed should move to commercial farming areas.

- b) Permission will continue to be granted for fencing of arable lands.
- c) Livestock management groups of small owners will be permitted to fence land allocated to them in communal grazing areas. (In practice, 'small owners' will be those who have fewer cattle than the limit fixed by the Land Board for individuals in the communal area).
- d) In enforcing the maximum number of cattle which can be kept in a communal area, cattle kept under the mafisa system will be counted as belonging to the holder.
- e) New individually-owned private boreholes will not normally be permitted in communal areas, except where an individual requires a borehole for domestic and agricultural purposes and watering a few stock on his lands. In such cases no-one will be permitted to water his stock in excess of the limit laid down by the Land Board. Individually-owned boreholes where owners are watering more stock than the limit laid down will be phased out over time. This will be done by helping such people to move to commercial areas, or by requiring them to form a syndicate or group with other stockowners, where this can be done within the carrying capacity around the borehole.

How Land will be Allocated in Commercial Areas

41. The objectives of the allocation policy are:
- a) To encourage fencing and improved management on existing cattleposts and to improve offtake and carrying capacity.
 - b) To encourage movement out of presently overstocked areas.
 - c) To encourage and promote groups of smaller cattle owners to participate in commercial ranching.
 - d) To control the amount of tribal land occupied by any one owner.

- e) To encourage resident management.
- f) To allow access to watering facilities for all cattle owners.

42. To achieve these objectives the following RULES will apply:

- a) Cattle owners in areas zoned for commercial ranching will, over a period of time, have to take out leases over their holdings. All new allocations in commercial areas will be the subject of leases.
- b) No borehole permissions will be granted to people who have drilled without Land Board permission.
- c) Allocations in commercial areas will only be made to individuals and groups who own a specified minimum number of livestock.
- d) Where a group owns enough cattle to get land in a commercial area, it will be given preference over an individual.
- e) Where a group or an individual owns enough cattle to get land in a commercial area, preference will be given to those who have not already got one or more commercial leases.
- f) Preference in allocating will be given to people from the most heavily overstocked communal areas, subject to paragraph 42 c), d) and e) above.
- g) Each Land Board will say how many land holdings and what total area an individual may have, taking into account the total land holding of the individual in all parts of Botswana. This will mean that those who own large numbers of boreholes may have to surrender some.

- h) Where persons or groups wish to have more land than the Land Board allows, Government will take positive steps to enable them to secure holdings in freehold and state leasehold areas.
- i) No commercial lease will be given over any existing borehole until satisfactory watering arrangements have been made for owners of all stock currently using that borehole if any of them are to be excluded from the commercial lease.
- j) A proper legal framework will be devised for groups or syndicates of farmers to enable them to obtain commercial leases.
- k) All borehole applications including those already approved but for which boreholes have not been drilled will be reviewed and evaluated in accordance with these rules.
- l) If a cattlepost owner is required to move under these rules, compensation will be payable.

Terms of Leases

- 43. Leases will be granted, as at present, under Section 21 of the Tribal Land Act, as common law leases.
- 44. The objectives of the terms of leases are:
 - a) To give the security of tenure necessary for the taking and granting of loans and for the introduction of improved management systems. Leases must be for a sufficient length of time to allow holders to recover their investments and some profits.
 - b) To retain ownership of land by the Tribal Land Boards.
 - c) To encourage and enforce improved management systems and to avoid destruction of tribal land through overgrazing and erosion.

- d) To avoid speculation in leases and failure to use the leasehold for the purpose intended.
- e) To ensure that local authorities receive a return from those who acquire the privilege of exclusive use of tribal land.

45. To achieve these objectives the following RULES will apply:

- a) *A period of fifty years, after which the lease will be renewable, is generally recommended although circumstances in a particular area may require shorter leases.*
- b) *Leases will be revocable only under clearly defined terms and procedures provided for in law.*
- c) *Rents will be charged and effectively collected.*
- d) *There will be restrictions on the transfer of leases, subject to safeguards for those who have provided loan finance.*
- e) *Leases will be inheritable for the duration of the lease.*
- f) *Subletting, and sub-division of holdings will only be permitted with the approval of the Land Board, which approval will not unreasonably be withheld.*

How the rules will be applied in different areas

46. As stated above, it will be necessary to adapt the proposed rules to the circumstances pertaining in each tribal area. The rules outlined have been determined primarily with the large tribal areas of Ngwato, Kweneng, Ngwaketse, and Tswana in mind. The smaller areas such as the Tati, Kgatleng, Rolong, Maletse, and Tlokwenng may find that the demand for land in their areas exceeds the total land available. It will therefore be necessary to be flexible in the application of the rules.

47. The changes described in this Paper will not happen overnight. Land development, especially if it is to be consistent with social justice, is a very long-term process which will continue not just for years but for decades. What is important now is to make a start.
48. The grazing land development programme may be described as a series of steps:

<u>Step Number</u>	<u>Action to be taken</u>
<u>Preliminaries</u>	
1	Provision of base maps
2	Sand veld survey
3	Village areas survey
4	Ground and surface water survey
<u>Allocation</u>	
5	Zoning of land areas
6	Legislation
7	Allocation of land
8	Lease arrangements
<u>Development</u>	
9	Formation of groups and organisation of communal projects
10	Loan funds and administration
11	Ranch development
12	Marketing arrangements
13	Enforcement and monitoring

Steps 1 to 4 should be taken as soon as possible over the next few years, so that the new system can start on a properly planned basis. Some districts will complete this stage faster than others as they have already done much of the work. Zoning and allocation can begin as soon as the facts are known. The Ministry of Local Government and Lands, in consultation with the Ministry of Agriculture, will examine each Land Board's overall zoning and allocation proposals to ensure that they conform with national, planning and policy principles.

49. Although Land Boards will be responsible for carrying out the policy, they are badly in need of more trained staff, technical expertise, and advice. They will be strengthened as quickly as possible, but will need a lot of help from Government in the early stages.

50. As indicated in paragraph 39, the first areas for commercial development will be identified quickly, to allow a start to be made on removing some of the larger herds from the communal village grazing areas and to allow those who acquire commercial allocations to begin developing their ranches.
51. It will take at least two years to plan and raise money, to give loans, and to put in boreholes, water reticulation, fencing and extension support in the commercial areas. A planning team will prepare this project. In the meantime, while the public is being informed and consulted about the policy, local authorities and field staff will press on with making proposals for such ranch development as is possible and desirable in 1975 and 1976 with the money and manpower already available. Some livestock owners will be able to develop commercial ranches with minimal assistance and their efforts will be guided to fit in with the overall policy.
52. There are a number of issues and implications which arise from this programme which will be further studied and dealt with. These are the availability of public transport, water equipment and fencing materials, the requirements for roads, borehole maintenance, physical and social infrastructure and the implications for settlement patterns of the future. The implications of this programme for freehold and state land policy must be considered.
53. It will be necessary to monitor and evaluate the changes in land use under this policy, and their effects, from the outset. The key matters to be considered are:
- a) The changing size and distribution of land holdings under the policy.
 - b) The effects of the policy on the ecology in communal and commercial grazing areas.
 - c) The efficiency of the process of allocating land by Land Boards.
 - d) The effects of the policy on rural incomes.
 - e) The state of public opinion and the effectiveness of public consultation about the programme.
 - f) The efficiency of group and co-operative ranch development in both communal and commercial areas.

PART VII : PUBLIC CONSULTATION ABOUT THE NATIONAL
POLICY ON TRIBAL GRAZING LAND

54. As was emphasized at the beginning of this Paper it is vital that the public be informed of the need for change and the reasoning behind the Government's proposals. The implications, consequences, costs and benefits - from the point of view of the livestock owner and the villager - must be sufficiently clear for general public understanding. It is most important that the dangers of misunderstanding be recognised and avoided.
55. Therefore, before implementation begins the Government will mount a nation - wide public discussion of the programme and the issues involved. People at every level will be fully informed and consulted before the process of change is set in motion.
56. The purpose of the public information campaign must be made quite clear. It is not intended to steamroller public opinion. Most members of the public know nothing about land development policy. We have now reached the stage of deciding how to implement grazing land policy, provided it receives widespread public support. But more than explanation is involved. Government wants to encourage wide public discussion of the policy. And so the first aim of the public information programme is to provide information on the policy. But it has three other aims as well: to stimulate public discussion; to provide information to Land Boards, District Councils, and Central Government on how people feel the policy should be implemented locally; and to start a long process of helping people to know how they can benefit from the policy by, for example, forming groups or syndicates of small cattle owners. Thus the programme of information and consultation will encourage comments, ideas and reactions from the districts, in order to make implementation as smooth as possible.
57. Parliamentary Debate will be followed up immediately by a programme of radio talks and public speeches by Ministers at Council and Kgotla meetings. A multi-media consultation programme, based on this Government Paper, will be launched. It will use radio programmes, with printed materials, and will be co-ordinated with the work of extension and other field staff. Councils, District Development Committees and VDCs will be asked to encourage public discussion, and take note of it, as part of this programme. Extension staff will help to organise the systematic feedback of public reactions to the programme.
58. Having obtained the views of the public in the ways described above, the Government will take appropriate action to give effect to these views. If necessary, it will revise the policy set out in this paper and present for Parliamentary approval the changes brought about by the process of consulting the people.

APPENDIX II

Lepasha Survey Results

Compounds 2, 3 and 4

Members	Relationship to Household head	Sex/Age	Origin
Keitsi	Head (employee)	Young man	Lepasha
Toegang	Wife	Young woman	Lepasha
Gakibakgati	Child	Child	Lepasha
Oneletswe	Child	Child	Lepasha
Babu	Child	Child	Lepasha
Bulelang	Head (employee)	Young man	Lepasha
Gabotokwe	Wife	Young woman	Lepasha
Sepone	Child	Child	Lepasha
Chabaisile	Head (employee)	Young man	Lepasha
Boinyani	Brother	Young man	Lepasha

- (i) Group affiliation/language: Basarwa, Chua
- (ii) Length of stay: 1½ years (the longest)
- (iii) Previously living/employed: Lepasha
- (iv) Number employed: 3
- (v) Wages (per month): P14/P11/P10 plus mealie meal.
- (vi) Livestock: (total) 1 goat, 4 donkeys, 2 chickens
- (vii) Cultivation: none
- (viii) Gathering: none
- (ix) School: one of Ketisi's children

C. Complaints

- (i) None except Chinamanama Syndicate.
(Barry & Yaxley, 1978, p. 1-27).

A. General Information

- (i) Ranch Number: OP-5
- (ii) Water source owner: T. Mokgethi (absentee)
- (iii) Approximate Area: 6,392 hectares
- (iv) Approximate Cattle: over 500
- (v) Arable lands: present
- (vi) Water source: one borehole
- (vii) Number of persons resident: 26
- (viii) Number of employees: 6
- (ix) Average wages per month: P5 plus mealie meal.
- (x) Other cattle post water source users: Mokobolo, Ganyo and Moloi

Members	Relationship to Household head	Sex/Age	Origin
Tabai	Head	Middle-aged Male	Mositse
Otamile	Wife	Middle-aged Female	Mositse
Motchanyide	Son	Young man	N.A.
Pharase	Child	Child	N.A.
Panyeletso	Child	Child	N.A.
Feleletso	Child	Child	N.A.
Galebue	Motchanyide's wife	Young woman	N.A.
Tamiso	Motchanyide's child	Child	N.A.
Mpulukelo	Motchanyide's child	Child	N.A.
Sara	Motchanyide's child	Child	N.A.

- (i) Group Affiliation/language: Basarwa, Chua speaking
- (ii) Length of stay: 4 years
- (iii) Previously living/employed: Mosetse
- (iv) Number employed: 1
- (v) Wages (per month): P18
- (vi) Livestock: 5 donkeys, 4 chickens
- (vii) Cultivation: $\frac{1}{2}$ hectare "garden"
- (viii) Gathering: Mogwana berries, thatching grass.
- (ix) Hunting: None

Other Residents

Makgaza
Ditseko
Msesuru
Gabongangwe
Ketsotagile

They reside at Tabai's compound for lengthy periods and are probably related, possibly working in Mosetse at odd jobs. (Barry and Yaxley, 1978, pp. 1-27).

C. Complaints

- (i) Ntane Motogelwa (Land Board, 1979, p. 3).
- (ii) The ranch will generally squeeze Mosetse River grazing area which is already reduced by the refugee camp and Cordon fence.

Note: (a) R.T. Ndwapi started illegal fencing prior to ranch approval (Wily, 1977, p. 8).
(b) R.T. Ndwapi also applied for another borehole along the Mosetse River (Land Board, 1979, p. 4).

A. General Information

- (i) Ranch number: OP-6
- (ii) Water source owner: M. Nkomo (usually resident)
- (iii) Approximate area: 6,236
- (iv) Approximate cattle: 62
- (v) Arable lands: present
- (vi) Water source: one well
- (vii) Number of persons resident: 8
- (viii) Number of persons employed: 3
- (ix) Average wage: P8 per month plus mealie meal

B. Residents By CompoundCompound 1

Members	Relationship to Household head	Sex/Age	Origin
Nkomo	Head (cattle post owner)	Old man	Tutume
Moni	Wife	Old woman	Tutume
Ntombizodwang	Child (probably daughter)	Child	Tutume
Maryoni	Child (probably daughter)	Child	Tutume
Elsie	Child (probably daughter)	Child	Tutume
Joseph	Employee	Young man	Kwadiba
Peter	Employee	Young man	Kwadiba
Woman	Peter's wife	Young woman	Kwadiba

- (i) Group affiliation: Cattle post owner - Bakalanga
Employees - Basarwa
- (ii) Length of stay: Owner - 5 years; Employees - 1 year (the longest)
- (iii) Previously living/employed: N.A.
- (iv) Number employed: 3
- (v) Wages (per month): P10/P6/P0 plus mealie meal.
- (vi) Livestock: 62 cattle, 5 goats, 12 donkeys (some probably employees), 3 chickens.
- (vii) Cultivation: small field, employees do labour
- (viii) Gathering: none
- (ix) Hunting: none

(Barry and Yaxley, 1978, pp. 1-27)

Complaints

- (i) Not applicable, does not wish to develop a ranch or have the resources to do so.

A. General Information

- (i) Ranch number: OP-7
- (ii) Water source owner: G.T. Mogale (absentee)
- (iii) Approximate area: 6,404 hectares
- (iv) Approximate cattle: 190 (also another cattle post)
- (v) Arable lands: none
- (vi) Water source: one borehole
- (vii) Number of persons resident: 7
- (viii) Number of employees: 5
- (ix) Average wage: P6 per month plus mealie meal, sugar and tea.

B. Residents by Compound

Compound 1

Members	Relationship to Household head	Sex/Age	Origin
Mores	Head	Young man	Maun
Mopane	Unrelated	Young man	Gweta
Korhoi	Unrelated	Boy	South Mosope
Madikordan	Mopane's mother	Old lady	Gweta

- (i) Group affiliation/language: Basarwa
- (ii) Length of stay: 4 years (the longest)
- (iii) Previously living/employed: N.A.
- (iv) Number employed: 3
- (v) Wages (per month): P10/P6/P3 plus food
- (vi) Livestock: 1 donkey
- (vii) Cultivation: none
- (viii) Gathering: Mogwana berries only

Compound 2

Members	Relationship to Household head	Sex/Age	Origin
Makoboso	Head (Mogale's relative)	Middle-aged male	Serowe
Monkga	Unrelated	Young man	Near Palapye
Moyo	Unrelated	Young man	Near Palapye

- (i) Group affiliation: Head, Bakalonga others probably Basarwa
- (ii) Length of stay: 4 years (the longest)
- (iii) Previously living/employed: N.A.
- (iv) Number employed: two
- (v) Wages (per month): P8/P4 plus food
- (vi) Livestock: 4 cattle (Mokoboso), 3 donkeys
- (vii) Cultivation: none
- (viii) Gathering: Mogwana berries

(Barry and Yaxley, 1978, p. 1-27)

- (i) Chinamanama Syndicate
 (ii) Bale
 Bobe
 Daniel Tshuba

(Barry, 1978, p. 6)

A. General Information

- (i) Ranch Number: OP-4
 (ii) Water source owner: O.J. Chilume (M.P.) (Absentee)
 (iii) Approximate area: 6,274 hectares
 (iv) Approximate cattle: 420, other cattle post, Lesyani
 (v) Arable lands: owner none
 (vi) Water source: one borehole
 (vii) Number of persons resident: 17 (approximate)
 (viii) Number of employees: 3 (approximate)
 (ix) Average wage: P8 per month plus mealie meal

B. Residents by CompoundCompound 1

Members	Relationship to Household head	Age/Sex	Origin
Leyani	Head (and cattle post owner and employee)	Middle-aged man	Nkange

- (i) Group affiliation/language: Bakalanga
 (ii) Length of stay: 6 years
 (iii) Previously living/employed: not available
 (iv) Number employed: 1
 (v) Wages (per month): P15 plus mealie meal
 (vi) Livestock: 101 cattle, 18 goats, 3 chickens
 (vii) Cultivation: none
 (viii) Gathering: none
 (ix) Hunting: rabbits
 (x) School attendance: not applicable

Compound 2

Members	Relationship to Household head	Age/Sex	Origin
Tabumbo	Head	Young man	Tutume
Selebatso	Girlfriend	Young woman	N.A.
Keletso	Friend	Young man	N.A.

- (i) Group affiliation/language: Basarwa
- (ii) Length of stay: 3 years
- (iii) Previously living/employed: not available (N.A.)
- (iv) Number employed: 2
- (v) Wages (per month); P5/P3 plus 90 kg. mealmeal
- (vi) Livestock: 2 chickens
- (vii) Cultivation: none
- (viii) Gathering: Mogwana berries only
- (ix) Hunting: None
- (x) School attendance: N/A*

Compound 3 (not employees, limited information)

Members	Relationship to Household head	Sex/Age	Origin
Tsahabisa Phosiwa	Head	Old man	Lepasha/ Mosetse
Witsentse	Brother	Older man	Lepasha/ Mosetse
Pikwe	Son	Middle-aged man	Lepasha/ Mosetse
Selebatso	Wife	Middle-aged woman	Lepasha/ Mosetse
Weitumela	Wife	Middle-aged woman	Lepasha/ Mosetse
Ditafolo	Child	N.A.	Lepasha
Maize	Child	N.A.	Lepasha
Monto	Child	N.A.	Lepasha
Leboro	Child	N.A.	Lepasha
Sendodi	Child	N.A.	Lepasha

- (i) Group affiliation/language: Basarwa
- (ii) Length of stay: N.A.
- (iii) Previously living/employed: Lepasha
- (iv) Number employed: none
- (v) Wages per month: N/A
- (vi) Livestock: 30 (Source: Scarr, 1980, p. 1)
- (vii) Arable lands: 9.5 acres
- (viii) Gathering: (probable)
- (ix) Hunting: N.A.
- (x) School: N.A. (Note: also 4 huts)

(Barry and Faxley, 1978, p. 1-27)

Other residents (with fixed assets within ranch)

- (i) Mpuledisany Mpule
Cultivation: 2 acres Cattle: 90
Huts: 2 (poor condition)

*Not Applicable.

- (ii) Gaaboi Mpule
Huts: 1
- (iii) Mpula Ramogatse
Cultivation: 109 acres (based on compensation)
Huts: 1
(Small) dam: 1
(Land Board, 1980, p. 2)

C. Complaints Recorded

- (i) B. Matsapa
Molambo
M. Mpute
(Land Board, 1979, p. 2)
- (ii) M. Matshaa
B.K. Madziba
G. Batisam
Taloba Molupo
Mokaloba Seeletso
J. Molambo
M. Phale
Tshabisa Phoshiwa
Mpuledisang Mpule
Kearobegu Kaenoa
and other Basarwa
(Land Board, 1979, p. 3)
- (iii) Thapelo Tabe
M. Mpule
Tshabisa
B. Matsapa
Molamto
Mamane
Kaisara
Tei
Momuse
Butale
Toka
Sidnang
(Scarr, 1980, p. 1)

A. General Information

- (i) Ranch Number: OP-8
- (ii) Water Source Owners: Chinamanaina Syndicate (some resident)
1st borehole: Matshara, Tumelo, Maziba, Mosokomane
Mazingo
2nd borehole: Mbi, Molaka
Well: Mazengwe
- (iii) Approximate area: 7,336
- (iv) Approximate cattle: 1000 plus
- (v) Arable lands: present one 3 hec. field, 3 gardens
- (vi) Water sources: 2 boreholes, 1 well
- (vii) Number of persons resident: 60
- (viii) Number of employees total: 9
- (ix) Average wage: P8.50 per month

B. Compounds (Because of the large number of compounds and the lack of desire to take a lease by owners no compound by compound data is given but only a brief summary)

- (i) Group Affiliation/Language: Owners - Bukalanga
Employees - Basarwa
- (ii) Average length of stay: 3 years
- (iii) Origin: Bokalaka and Lepasha
- (iv) Gathering: Mogwana berries only

C. Complaints

- (1) No complaints about forming a ranch as owners did not desire this, rather residents complained about other ranches, mainly that grazing area would be reduced.

A. General Information

- (i) Ranch number: OP-9
- (ii) Ranch owner: J.G. Mathangwane (resident)
- (iii) Approximate area: 6,928 hectares
- (iv) Approximate cattle: 290
- (v) Arable lands: none reported
- (vi) Water source: one borehole
- (vii) Number of persons resident: 16
- (viii) Number of employees: 3
- (ix) Average wage: P12 per month plus food

B. Residents by Compound

Members	Relationship to household head	Sex/Age	Origin
J.G. Mathangwane	Head(B.H. owner)	Middle-aged Man	Nshakashokwe
Baloki	Wife	Middle-aged Woman	Nshakashokwe
Diowane	Daughter	Young woman	Nshakashokwe
Bigane	Daughter's child	Child	Nshakashokwe
Mpepi	Daughter's child	Child	Nshakashokwe
Chipo	Daughter's child	Child	Nshakashokwe

- (i) Group affiliation/language: Bakalanga
- (ii) Length of stay: 3 years
- (iii) Previously employed/living: N.A.
- (iv) Number employed N/A
- (v) Wages: N/A
- (vi) Livestock: 290 cattle, 26 goats
- (vii) Gathering: none
- (viii) Hunting: None
- (ix) School attendance: one child

Compounds 2, 3 and 4

Members	Relationship to Household head	Sex/Age	Origin
Keitsi	Head (employee)	Young man	Lepasha
Toegang	Wife	Young woman	Lepasha
Gakibakgati	Child	Child	Lepasha
Oneletswe	Child	Child	Lepasha
Babu	Child	Child	Lepasha
Bulelang	Head (employee)	Young man	Lepasha
Gabotokwe	Wife	Young woman	Lepasha
Sepone	Child	Child	Lepasha
Chabaisile	Head (employee)	Young man	Lepasha
Boinyani	Brother	Young man	Lepasha

- (i) Group affiliation/language: Basarwa, Chua
- (ii) Length of stay: 1½ years (the longest)
- (iii) Previously living/employed: Lepasha
- (iv) Number employed: 3
- (v) Wages (per month): P14/P11/P10 plus mealie meal.
- (vi) Livestock: (total) 1 goat, 4 donkeys, 2 chickens
- (vii) Cultivation: none
- (viii) Gathering: none
- (ix) School: one of Ketisi's children

C. Complaints

- (i) None except Chinamanama Syndicate.
(Barry & Yaxley, 1978, p. 1-27).

A. General Information

- (i) Ranch Number: OP-5
- (ii) Water source owner: T. Mokgethi (absentee)
- (iii) Approximate Area: 6,392 hectares
- (iv) Approximate Cattle: over 500
- (v) Arable lands: present
- (vi) Water source: one borehole
- (vii) Number of persons resident: 26
- (viii) Number of employees: 6
- (ix) Average wages per month: P5 plus mealie meal.
- (x) Other cattle post water source users: Mokobolo, Ganyo and Moloi

B. Residents by CompoundCompound 1

Members	Relationship to Household Head	Sex/Age	Origin
Batengesl	Head	Young man	N.A.
Bolaiya	Brother	Young man	N.A.
Ntogelang	Brother	Young man	N.A.
Gabytala	Uncle	Old man	N.A.
Kesinsi	Mother	Old woman	Tutume
Letagong	Sister	Child	N.A.
Makwa	Sister	Child	N.A.
Kowa	Bolaiya's wife	Young woman	N.A.
Nyolo	Bolaiya's child	Child	N.A.
Tso	Bolaiya's child	Child	N.A.

- (i) Group affiliation/language: Basarwa, Chua speaking
(ii) Length of stay: 7 years
(iii) Previously living/employed: Pūduloa, near Mosetse (water from Ntane's bonehole)
(iv) Number employed: 3
(v) Wages (per month): P5/P5/P5 plus 90 kg. bag of mealie meal
(vi) Livestock: 4 goats, 2 donkeys, 24 chickens
(vii) Cultivation: Labour on Mokethi's lands, receive three-90 kg. bags of maize annually.
(viii) Gathering: Mogwana berries

Compound 2

Members	Relationship to Household Head	Sex/Age	Origin
Dema	Head	Young man	Tutume
Bakazi	Wife	Young woman	Tutume
Lulu	Child	Child	Tutume
Mapato	Child	Child	Tutume
Matse	Child	Child	Tutume
Basimane	Child	Child	Tutume

- (i) Group affiliation/language: Basarwa, Chua speaking
(ii) Length of stay: 3 years
(iii) Previously living/employed: N.A.
(iv) Number employed: 1
(v) Wages (per month): P10 plus 50 kg. mealie meal
(vi) Livestock: 5 chickens
(vii) Cultivation: Labour on Mokgethi's lands, receive 3 bags maize per annum
(viii) Gathering: Mogwana berries

Compound 3

Members	Relationship to Household Head	Sex/Age	Origin
Mokobolo	Head (cattle post owner)		Tutume
Boikanyo	Wife		Tutume
Mostestewe	Child		N.A.
Eliga	Nephew		N.A.
Charles	Friend		Tutume
Mokhai	Employee		N.A.
Selela	Mokhai's wife		N.A.
Child?	Mokhai's child		N.A.
Kegatile	Mokhai's grandmother		N.A.
Omtaste	Mokhai's cousin		N.A.

- (i) Group affiliation/language: cattle post owner, Bokalanga, employees, Basarwa, Chua speaking
- (ii) Length of stay: 3-4 years
- (iii) Previously living/employed: N.A.
- (iv) Number employed: 2
- (v) Wages (per month): P5/P0 plus 50 kg. mealie meal
- (vi) Livestock: Cattle post owner - 100 cattle plus employees - 5 chickens
- (vii) Cultivation: Small field of maize and beans, employees do labour
- (viii) Gathering: mogwana and montsho
- (ix) Hunting: none
- (x) School attendance: cattle post owner's child

(Barry and Yaxley, 1978, p. 1-27)

C. Complaints

- (i) Mosetse cattle owners and Mosetse residents need to be considered, as in the case of O.I. Chilume's ranch re - grazing rights

(Barry, 1978, p. 5)

A. General Information

- (i) Ranch Number: OP-10
- (ii) Ranch owner: M. Maswikiti (M.P.) (absentee)
- (iii) Approximate area: 6,392 hectares
- (iv) Approximate cattle: 220 plus
- (v) Arable lands: present
- (vi) Water source: one borehole
- (vii) Number of persons resident: 9

- (viii) Number of employees: 2
 (ix) Average wage (per month): P14

B. Residents by Compound

Compound 1

Members	Relationship to Household Head	Sex/Age	Origin
Zibani Lesenda	Head	Middle-aged man	Ramashwa
Bangwe	Wife	Middle-aged woman	(Bokalaka)
Norman	Child	Child	N.A.
Oteng	Child	Child	N.A.
Tamani	Child	Child	N.A.
Salomi	Child	Child	N.A.
Mokgethi	Child	Child	N.A.
Depails	Child	Child	N.A.

- (i) Group affiliation/language: Bokalanga
 (ii) Length of stay: six years
 (iii) Previously living/employed: Ramashwa
 (iv) Number employed: 1
 (v) Wages (per month): P16
 (vi) Livestock: 10 cattle
 (vii) Cultivation: Fields app. 15 acres
 (viii) Gathering: Mogwana

Compound 2

Members	Relationship to Household Head	Sex/Age	Origin
Makgonono	Head	Middle-aged man	N.A.

- (i) Group affiliation: Sekoba speaking
 (ii) Length of stay: 2 years
 (iii) Previously living/employed: N.A.
 (iv) Number employed: 1
 (v) Wages (per month): P12
 (vi) Livestock: none
 (vii) Cultivation: none

(Barry and Yaxley, 1978, p. 1-27)

C. Conflicts

- (1) Only limited conflicts, some use of ranch for gathering.
- (ii) Initial boundaries placed J.G. Mathangwanes (ranch owner) house within Maswikiti's ranch. The boundary problem was rectified.

A. General Information

- (i) Ranch number: OP-11
- (ii) Water source owners: V.S. Kenosi and Tebelelo Maposa (one resident) related
- (iii) Approximate area: 5,548 hectares
- (iv) Approximate cattle: over 200
- (v) Arable lands: present
- (vi) Water source: 2 boreholes
- (vii) Number of persons resident: 16
- (viii) Number of persons employed: 7
- (ix) Average wage: P8 per month plus mealie meal

B. Residents by CompoundCompound 1

Members	Relationship to Household Head	Sex/Age	Origin
Skojane	Household head	Young man	Lepasha
Tobui	Mother	Middle-aged woman	South Morope
Goli	Aunt	Middle-aged woman	South Morope
Kesiboni	Sister	Young woman	Lepasha
Selelo	Sister	Young woman	Lepasha
Shadi	Sister	Young woman	Lepasha
Mosi	Brother	Boy	Lepasha
Latego	Selelo's child	Boy	Lepasha
Kesinelive	Selelo's child	Boy	Lepasha
Ketseletso	Niece	Young woman	Lepasha

- (i) Group affiliation: Basarwa, Chua speaking
- (ii) Length of stay: 12 years
- (iii) Previously living/employed: Chinamanama
- (iv) Number employed: 4
- (v) Wages per month: P12/P8/P5/P4 plus food
- (vi) Livestock: 4 donkeys, 2 chickens
- (vii) Cultivation: $\frac{1}{2}$ hectare garden, yield - four 90 kg. bags or sorghum (unreliable)
- (viii) Gathering: Mogwana berries and thatching grass.

Compound 2

Member	Relationship to Household Head	Sex/Age	Origin
Tebelelo	Head (joint B.H. owner)	Young man	Nshakashokwe
Kekanetswe	Wife	Young woman	N.A.
Galetelelwe	Employee	Young man	Lepashe

- (i) Group affiliation/language: cattle post owner - Bokalanga, employee, Chua speaking
(ii) Length of stay: five years
(iii) Previously living/employed: Chinamanama
(iv) Number employed: 1
(v) Wages per month: P7 plus 90 kg. mealie meal
(vi) Livestock: 125 cattle, 14 goats, 20 chickens
(vii) Cultivation: present, possibly 25 hectares

Compound 3

Member	Relationship to Household Head	Sex/Age	Origin
Dikeledi	Head	Middle age man	Nata
Sololelo	Wife	Middle age woman	Nata
Kelemogile	Sister	Middle age woman	Nata

- (i) Group affiliation/language: Basarwa
(ii) Length of stay: 5½ years
(iii) Previously employed: Nata
(iv) Number employed: 2
(v) Wages (per month): P14/P6 plus 90 kg. mealie meal
(vi) Livestock: N.A.
(vii) Cultivation: garden

(Barry and Yaxley, 1978, p. 1-27)

C. Complaints or Possible Conflicts

- (i) Modise
Zwambele Kenosi
Mbako Mongwa

(Barry, 1978, p. 5)

- (ii) M. Mongwa
Z. Kenosi

(Landboard, 1979, p. 2)

- (iii) Telelelo Mapoa (co-owner against fencing)
N. Nswazwi
T. Mokgethi

(Land Board, 1979, p. 4).

- (iv) Other Basarwa from Lepasha communal area who said they gathered within the ranch.

A. General Information

- (i) Ranch number: OP-12
(ii) Water source owner: R. Manisa (absentee)
(iii) Approximate area: 5,968
(iv) Approximate cattle: 180
(v) Arable lands: present area N.A.
(vi) Water sources: two boreholes
(vii) Number of persons resident: 10
(viii) Number of persons employed: 2
(ix) Average wage per month: P8
(x) Other cattle owning water source users (possibly owners):
Nthusang, Gile

B. Residents By Compound

Compound 1

Members	Relationship to Household Head	Age/Sex	Origin
Kgantseng	Head	Middle-age man	Mata
Bagatseng	Wife	N.A.	N.A.
Gowitomanang	Son	N.A.	N.A.
Olikile	Son	N.A.	N.A.
Kelemao	Daughter	N.A.	N.A.
Wita	Unrelated	Old man	N.A.
Gane	Wife	Old woman	N.A.

- (i) Group affiliation/language: Basarwa
(ii) Length of stay: 8 years
(iii) Previously living/employed: one of S. Khamas' cattle post
(iv) Number employed: 1
(v) Wages (per month): P8
(vi) Livestock: 1 fowl
(vii) Cultivation: Works on owners lands, three-90 kg. bags sorghum per annum
(viii) Gathering: Mogwana berries and thatching grass

Compound 2

Members	Relationship to Household Head	Age/Sex	Origin
Kebonye	Head	Old man	Nata
Ousokorae	Wife	Old woman	N.A.
Boyce	Relative	Youth	N.A.

- (i) Group affiliation/language: Basarwa
- (ii) Length of stay: 6 years
- (iii) Previously living/employed: Sezipa
- (iv) Number employed: 1
- (v) Wages (per month): P8 plus occasional mealie meal
- (vi) Livestock: none
- (vii) Cultivation: none
- (viii) Gathering: Mogwana and thatching grass

(Barry and Yaxley, 1978, p. 1-27)

C. Complaints

- (i) intensive use of ranch area by Lepasha residents

Gabue	Lesole Mosinui
R. Segaletso	Lethanolo Diesel
D. Segaletso	Mbengana
A.M. Hutton	M. Mongwe
Puo	Monyatsi
Nkale	Galeforolwe

(Barry, 1978, p. 6)

- (ii) Complaints S. Segaletso, Dikgakgamatso Kebailele, V.S. Kenosi, T. Maposa, T. Mokgethi

(Land Board, 1979, p. 4)

A. General Information

- (i) Ranch number: OP-14
- (ii) Water source owner(s): D. Moshabe and Keletso Mogomotsi (absentee)
- (iii) Approximate area: 6,468 hectares
- (iv) Approximate cattle: 400 plus
- (v) Arable lands: present, over 3 hectares
- (vi) Water source: one borehole each
- (vii) Number of persons resident: 27
- (viii) Number of employees: 7
- (ix) Average wage: P9 per month plus mealie meal

Compound 1

Members	Relationship to Household Head	Sex/Age	Origin
Taboifane Moshabe	Head (son of owner)	Young man	Mathangwane
Ogatama	Wife	N.A.	Mathangwane
Motsila	Mother	Old woman	Mathangwane
Njabo	Relative	Young man	Mathangwane
Goro	Wife of Njabo	N.A.	Mathangwane
Maja	Sister	N.A.	Mathangwane
Sara	Child	N.A.	Mathangwane
Dondo	Child	N.A.	Mathangwane
Matogo	Child	N.A.	Mathangwane
Dato	Child	N.A.	Mathangwane
Phaladi	Unrelated	N.A.	Goshwe

- (i) Group affiliation/language: Bakalanga
(ii) Length of stay: one month to 10 years
(iii) Previously living/employed: N.A.
(iv) Number employed: 2
(v) Wages (per month): P10/P10 plus mealie meal
(vi) Livestock: 2 cattle, 14 goats, 3 chickens
(vii) Cultivation: 3 hectares
(viii) Gathering: thatching grass

Compound 2

Members	Relationship to Household Head	Sex/Age	Origin
Toloka	Head	Middle aged man	Lepasha
Lea	Wife	N.A.	Lepasha
Keamogetse	Child	N.A.	Lepasha
Mapitshea	Child	N.A.	Lepasha
Mandruwe	Child	N.A.	Lepasha
Bok	Child	N.A.	Lepasha
Bado	Unrelated	Young man	Rantswarisang

- (i) Group affiliation/language: Basarwa
(ii) Length of stay: 10 years
(iii) Previously employed/living: Lepasha
(iv) Number employed: 2
(v) Wages (per month); P5/P1 and a beast per year plus mealie meal
(vi) Livestock: 1 cow, 5 chickens
(vii) Cultivation: garden, 1 bag sorghum and 1 bag maize
(viii) Gathering: Mogwana berries only

Members	Relationship to Household Head	Sex/Age	Origin
Isaac	Head	Young man	Gabane
Motsware	Unrelated	Young man	Mochudi
Banyana	Wife	N.A.	N.A.
Teseletso	Child	N.A.	N.A.
Rantsetsane	Unrelated	Middle-aged man	Nata
Wara	Wife?	N.A.	N.A.
Shimanyane	Child	N.A.	N.A.
Pudulogo	Child	N.A.	N.A.
Dondo?	Child	N.A.	N.A.

- (i) Group affiliation/language: Balete and Basarwa
(ii) Length of stay: 2 months to 6 years
(iii) Previously living/employed: Gabane/Matsitama, Nata
(iv) Number employed: 3
(v) Wages (per month): P12/P8/N.A. plus mealie meal
(vi) Livestock: 3 chickens
(vii) Cultivation: None
(viii) Hunting: none

(Barry and Yaxley, 1978, p. 1-27)

C. Complaints

- (i) 24 complainants the same as T. Chengeta's ranch 2026-L2 (see T. Chengeta's ranch results for a list of names).
(Land Board, 1979, p. 2 and 3)
- (ii) D Moshabe and Keletso Mogomolsi would have to syndicate prior to ranch approval.

(Barry, 1978, p. 6)

A. General Information

- (i) Ranch number: OP-13
(ii) Water source owner: T. Chengeta (wife resident)
(iii) Approximate area: 6,468 hectares
(iv) Approximate cattle: 400 on ranch, others: 1,500
(v) Arable land: 33 hectares, also small shop
(vi) Water source: 2 boreholes
(vii) Number of persons resident: 9
(viii) Number of employees: 8
(ix) Average wage: P22 (plus food?) per month (unreliable)

B. Residents by CompoundCompound 1

Members	Relationship to Household Head	Age/Sex	Origin
Rosy Chengeta	Head (owner's wife)	Middle-aged woman	Nshakashokwe

Other Compounds (Employees)

Members	Relationship to Household Head	Age/Sex	Origin
Badi Mokame	Unrelated to head	Young man	N.A.
Kavelo Keteresti	Unrelated to head	Young man	Lethakone
Maronga	Unrelated to head	Young man	Bokalaka
Joseph	Unrelated to head	Young man	Bokalaka
Nwaga	Unrelated to head	Young man	Lepasha
Dimapo	Unrelated to head	Young man	Mokgalo
Bono	Unrelated to head	Young man	Chadibe
Star	Unrelated to head	Young man	Francistown*

*Note: from observation some were actually from Angola.

- (i) Group affiliation/language: Bakalanga and Basarwa
- (ii) Length of stay: 1 month to 8 years
- (iii) Previously living/employed: not available
- (iv) Number employed: 8
- (v) Wages (per month): Respondants P30/P30/P25/P20/P15/P15
- (vi) Livestock: none
- (vii) Cultivation: None
- (viii) Gathering: Mogwana berries only
- (ix) Hunting: none
- (x) School attendance: (not applicable)

(Barry and Yaxley, 1978, p. 1-27)

C. Complaints Recorded

- (i) Galeforolwe
Nkala
Mbise Mpusa

(Barry, 1978, p. 6)

- (ii) Bilani Kelebogile
B. Masalila
Keletso Mogomotsi
Otshaleng Disejane
Shoto Phipi
Gagore Mathodi
Kelaotswe Moswennyane
Richard Unowe
- Matuwe Motshwanesi
N. Nswazwi
Togelang Lesole
Kgosietsile Maweni
Rasedisa Motshwanaesi
Poo Phiri
Goitseone Mathodi
Balingi Mushango

Kubata Maja	Tobokani Bontsi
Mbize Motswetla	Mokone Sukuza
Mbize Mphutu	Jeremia Manyepedza
Khani Manyepedza	Mmaa Khule

(Ngwato Land Board, 1979, p. 2)

- | | |
|-------------------|--------------|
| (iii) O. Sebalaba | G. Sesenyi. |
| M. Makwaza | S. Segaetsho |
| B. Nfila | |

(Ngwato Land Board, 1979, p. 1)

Lepasha Communal AreaA. General Information

- (i) Area: approximately 15,000 hectares easily accessible
- (ii) Human population: 175 Basarwa plus 40 non-Basarwa
= 215 plus (Wily, 1977, p. 5)
- (iii) Cattle population: over 700, Basarwa own 88
(Barry, 1978, p. 7)
- (iv) Water sources: 10 total (mainly clustered), 4 wells,
6 boreholes
- (v) Settlements: 20 total, 14 Basarwa (*Note: settlements are
defined as different spatial clusters of people by
compound or groups of compounds.
(Wily, 1977, p. 5)
- (vi) Arable lands: present, 10 Basarwa settlements have
arable lands, usually under 2 hectares, no data is
available on non-Basarwa households
(Wily, 1977, p. 6)
- (vii) Employment: 22 persons, wages N.A.
(Barry, 1978, p. 7)

B. Summary of Water Source Owners

- (i) D. Kgakgamatso Kebailele (headman)
Water source: well
Cattle: N.A.
- (ii) Gubuwe (Basarwa's representative)
Water source: well
Cattle: 50
- (iii) Lethonlo Diesel (Basarwa)
Water source: well
Cattle: 50

- (iv) David Segaetsho
2 water sources: well and borehole
Cattle: N.A.
- (v) L. Mosinyi
Water source: borehole (possible Botswan Concessions Limited - B.C.L. drilled)
Cattle: N.A.
- (vi) Mbengana and others
Water source: borehole B.C.L. drilled
Cattle: N.A.
- (vii) Amy Hutton
Water source: borehole B.C.L. drilled
Cattle: N.A.
- (viii) Nkala
Water source: borehole
Cattle: N.A.
- (ix) Galeforolwe
Water source: borehole
Cattle: N.A.

(Wily, 1977, p. 4)

C. Other Basarwa Cattle Ownership

- (i) Tunuwe, 8 cattle waters at Kebaulele's well
- (ii) Tshilego, 10 cattle waters at Segaetsho's well or borehole
- (iii) Employee of Kebaulele's, one ox
- (iv) Malau, 5 cattle, waters at Gubuwe's well
- (v) Employee of Tsametse's, two cattle

(Wily, 1977, p. 6)

D. Complaints

Most of the persons listed above complained about the effects that privately fenced land would have on their livelihoods. Restricted access was perceived by communal area residents to effect grazing capacity, wild food supply and other natural resource supplies such as thatching grass and firewood. *Note: See Ngwato Land Board Reports and Minutes which record the extent of these complaints.

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